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RESOLVING THE CROWDFUNDING
CONUNDRUM: THE EXPERIENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN
BY: RAFAEL A. PORRATA-DORIA, JR.*

The phenomenon known as crowdfunding has become an attractive
alternative for businesses looking for investors without having to go
through more well-established routes or without necessarily having to
lure and impress professional investors. However, this new form of
raising capital creates a series of issues and problems unique to
crowdfunding, which has led to a struggle amongst governments to
effectively regulate this new entrepreneurial opportunity.
The
crowdfunding conundrum government regulators are facing causes them
to have to reconcile two contradictory missions: facilitating the
acquisition of capital by businesses and protecting investors (and the
market) from fraud and manipulation. This Article analyzes this
conundrum from a United States (“U.S.”) and Spanish perspective. I
first describe the crowdfunding conundrum in general terms by
explaining how crowdfunding (both consumer and accredited investor)
works in practice and explore the major problems and issues that startup
companies, investors, the market, and the state face in crowdfunding,
which need to be resolved in a regulatory system. I will then describe
and evaluate the current American and Spanish and proposed European
regulatory solutions to the crowdfunding conundrum. I then conclude by
evaluating whether and how well the United States’ and Spain’s
regulations, as well as the European Union’s (“EU”) proposed
regulations, have attempted to resolve the conundrum by balancing the
risks and problems facing crowdfunding transactions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Crowdfunding” is generally understood to describe an increasingly
widespread fundraising technique by means of which the Internet is used to
raise funds for a particular goal from a large number of contributors.1
Operating through platforms such as Kickstarter2 and Indiegogo,3
crowdfunding has been used extensively to raise capital for ventures
involving charities,4 movies,5 art projects,6 and new product development.7
Some of the more unusual crowdfunding attempts have involved funding the
Russian rebels’ war against Ukraine8 and paying off Greece’s debt to the
European Central Bank.9 Although some of these campaigns have
successfully raised the funds they sought,10 many of them have failed to raise
*Professor of Law, Temple University. I would like to thank Ms. Kennedy E. Munro,
Temple Law ‘20, for her invaluable assistance.
1. Gerrit K.C. Ahlers et al., Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, 39
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 955, 955 (2015); Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity
Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 567 (2015) [hereinafter
Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding].
2. KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
3. INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
4. See Heath Druzin, Crowdfunding Site to Host Veterans Day Charity Drive,
STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 18, 2015), https://www.stripes.com/news/veterans/crowdfun
ding-site-to-host-veterans-day-charity-drive-1.373633.
5. See Dave McNary, ‘Super Troopers 2’ Raises $4.4 Million Total in Fundraising
Campaign, VARIETY (Apr. 25, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://variety.com/2015/film/news/
super-troopers-2-raises-4-4-million-total-in-fundraising-campaign-1201466155/.
6. See ARTHENA, http://www.arthena.com/ (last visited May 1, 2020) (labeling
itself as “the first quantitative investment firm for art assets”).
7. See Sacha Pfeiffer, An 11-Year-Old’s Idea Finds a Fan Base, THE BOSTON
GLOBE (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:56 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/08/04/
year-old-entrepreneur-expands-his-youngbusiness/HJkBNFbMhBzbfXPQvuOnUL/story.html.
8. See Jo Becker & Steven Lee Myers, Russian Groups Crowdfund the War in the
Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/world/
europe/russian-groups-crowdfund-the-war-in-ukraine.html (finding that more than a
dozen groups in Russia have raised money in an online campaign to support Russian
rebels in the war in Ukraine).
9. See Katie Rogers, A Crowdfunding Campaign Tries to Save Greece, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/world/europe/a-crowdfundingcampaign-tries-to-save-greece.html (stating that €487,000 was raised through a
campaign on Indiegogo to help fund Greece’s debt of €1.5 billion to the International
Monetary Fund).
10. See, e.g., Mahita Gajanan, Travel Jacket Breaks Record Raising $9 Million on
Kickstarter, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
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any funds whatsoever.11 This type of crowdfunding, often called “rewardbased crowdfunding,” appears to be subject to scant regulation.12
Startup companies have also taken advantage of crowdfunding. Many of
such companies have raised capital by selling equity or equity-like
participations in the company through an Internet platform to a large number
of small investors.13 This type of crowdfunding has become known as
“equity crowdfunding”14 and has been used extensively. Indeed, as of April
2012, startup companies, using thirty-nine Internet platforms mostly located
in Ireland, Australia, and the United Kingdom, had raised $88 billion.15 As
we shall see below, crowdfunding presents a highly attractive funding
alternative for startup companies for a number of reasons. First, raising
capital through smaller investments, made by many non-professional
investors (who are excited by the company’s sales pitch), is more attractive
than seeking professional investors because the non-professional investors
are unlikely to be as demanding as the professional investors. Moreover,
Internet investors are also easier to find than professional investors, since
they find the company, and not vice versa. Additionally, crowdfunding
allows startup companies to raise capital simply and cheaply, with little or
none of the costly formalities currently required.16 This last characteristic is
critical, since most startup companies lack the knowledge, experience, and
assets to hire experts to prepare extensive disclosure documents.17
Crowdfunding investors prefer a system that allows them to invest small
technology/2015/sep/03/worlds-best-travel-jacket-kickstarter-record-funding; Arthur
Nelsen, World’s Largest Ocean Cleanup Operation One Step Closer To Launch, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2015, 6:52 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2015/nov/13/worlds-largest-ocean-cleanup-operation-one-step-closer-to-launch
(“[A]round half the scheme’s initial €30m (£20m) budget has now been raised through
online donations and wealthy sponsors.”).
11. See Nell Frizzell, Kickended: The Enthralling World of Crowdfunding Flops,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2014, 8:12 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/artand
design/2014/nov/14/-sp-kickfunded-the-enhralling-world-of-kickstarter-crowdfundingfailures (highlighting a website called Kickended — an online archive of the many
Kickstarter campaigns that failed to raise a single dollar).
12. See Ahlers et al., supra note 1, at 957.
13. Id. at 958; see CROWDFUNDER, https://www.crowdfunder.com/raise-capital (last
visited May 1, 2020) (billing itself as a leader in equity crowdfunding that has raised
capital for many companies from investors).
14. See Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintegration: Crowdfunding and Online Auction
IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 238–39 (2015) (defining equity crowdfunding as the sale
of company interests to the general public on the Internet).
15. Id. at 242 n.141.
16. See id. at 220.
17. See infra p. 232.

2020

RESOLVING THE CROWDFUNDING CONUNDRUM

223

amounts easily and with limited costs in companies whose products excite
them, to communicate and exchange information with fellow investors, and
to cash out their investment in an expeditious manner. At the same time,
these investors have a strong desire for the investment system to be
trustworthy and protect them from scams and frauds.18 Despite its appeal
and apparent ease of use, equity crowdfunding is a risky endeavor, since
approximately ninety percent of all startup businesses in the United States
fail within the first year.19 Indeed, as we shall see below,20 the crowdfunding
phenomenon creates a series of issues and problems that make government
regulation extremely challenging.
Crowdfunding presents a difficult conundrum for markets and regulations
faced with two contradictory missions: facilitating the acquisition of capital
by businesses and protecting investors (and the market) from fraud and
manipulation.21 Given the nature of crowdfunding and its actors, fulfilling
both missions is very problematic. In order to facilitate the acquisition of
capital by startup businesses through crowdfunding, regulators must make
the process simple, quick, and affordable. This approach would involve
implementing simple forms, limited disclosures, and low fees. Protecting
investors and the market from fraud and manipulation, on the other hand,
may be achieved by educating investors, requiring full disclosure of all
material facts regarding the company and the offering,22 establishing time
constraints on sales to give both potential investors and the market time to
absorb and evaluate the disclosed information and appropriately price the
offering,23 or limiting investments for small investors.24 These tasks may be
delegated to the market itself25 or, in the case of crowdfunding, to the
intermediary. Unfortunately, utilizing these investor protection mechanisms
adds time, cost, and complexity to the capital acquisition process. The easier
a regulator makes it for a startup company to raise capital by deregulating
18. See infra pp. 233–34.
19. MAX MARMER ET AL., STARTUP GENOME REPORT EXTRA ON PREMATURE

SCALING 4 (2011), https://media.rbcdn.ru/media/reports/StartupGenomeReport2_Why
_Startups_Fail_v2.pdf.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra pp. 236–37.
22. See infra pp. 236–37.
23. See infra pp. 236–37.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra note 118 (discussing how the NYSE Regulations work with the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to enforce compliance by the companies listed
on the New York Stock Exchange with federal rules and exchange rules meant to protect
investors).
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the process, the less protection investors have against fraud and
manipulation.26 Conversely, the more protection investors have against
fraud and manipulation, the higher the cost and difficulty of raising capital.27
In resolving the crowdfunding conundrum, these two interests need to be
balanced so that companies participate in a capital acquisition process that
provides them reasonable access to capital, and investors receive an
appropriate level of protection against fraud and manipulation.
A number of countries have either recently adopted or are considering
adopting legislation or regulations that will permit companies to raise capital
through crowdfunding.28 This Article will examine the attempts of two
countries, the United States and Spain, to create a regulatory system that will
resolve the crowdfunding conundrum.
In the United States, startup companies seeking to raise capital through
crowdfunding before 2012 were unable to do so because the federal
securities law prohibited the practice.29 In December 2012, Congress passed
a statute named the “Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act” (“JOBS Act”),30
which completely eliminated this prohibition.
The JOBS Act permits crowdfunding transactions to be undertaken in two
different ways. In Title II, the JOBS Act created an exemption to the 1933
Securities Act, which allows the sale of securities through an Internet
platform to consumers, subject to a number of limitations.31 In order to
implement this exemption, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) issued an implementing regulation known as “Regulation
Crowdfunding” (“Regulation CF”).32 I will refer to this process as
“consumer crowdfunding.” Title III of the JOBS Act also created a different
exemption that authorized the creation of Internet platforms, which were
authorized to sell securities, as long as the purchasers who utilized such
platforms were wealthy individuals. I will refer to this process as “accredited
investor crowdfunding.”
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra note 120.
28. See generally Commission Staff Working Document: Crowdfunding in the EU

Capital Markets Union, at 34, SWD (2016) 154 final (Mar. 5, 2016) [hereinafter Staff
Working Document] (listing and describing crowdfunding regimes of eight memberstates of the European Union).
29. See infra notes 90–103 and accompanying text.
30. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. 306.
31. Id.
32. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (proposed Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 200).
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Accredited investor crowdfunding has been in use in the United States
since 2013, and reports indicate that 1,929 companies raised $118 billion
through Internet offerings between September 2013 and September 2014
alone.33 For consumer crowdfunding, the situation has been very different.
The JOBS Act’s consumer crowdfunding provisions could not become
effective until the SEC issued implementing regulations, which were
adopted on October 30, 2015. These regulations, known as Regulation CF
were finalized on November 16, 2015 and became effective on May 16,
2016.34 Accordingly, consumer crowdfunding is a very recent phenomenon
in the United States.
Spain’s legal system, which is based on the civil law tradition, did not
permit crowdfunding until 2015.35 At that time, Spain enacted a statute
known as the “Ley de Fomento de la Financiación Empresarial,”36 whose
Title V authorizes and regulates the sale of securities through crowdfunding
transactions.37 Although the Spanish crowdfunding statute resembles its
U.S. counterpart, a number of its provisions present different solutions to
some of the regulatory problems presented by crowdfunding.38 The EU has
also recently circulated a draft regulation that seeks to resolve the
crowdfunding conundrum by proposing to establish a European
crowdfunding regime, which would supplement national crowdfunding
regulatory systems and introduce innovative regulatory ideas.39
In Parts II and III of this Article, I will describe the crowdfunding
conundrum in general terms by explaining how crowdfunding (both
consumer and accredited investor) works in practice and explore the major
problems and issues that startup companies, investors, the market, and the
state face in crowdfunding, which need to be resolved in a regulatory system.
I will then describe and evaluate the current American, Spanish, and
proposed European regulatory solutions to the crowdfunding conundrum in
Parts IV, V, and VI. Finally, in Part VII, I will draw from this experience
33. OFFERBOARD, EQUITY CROWDFUNDING UNDER TITLE II OF THE JOBS ACT: THE
FIRST YEAR 5 (2014) [hereinafter OFFERBOARD] (on file with author); Erin Hobey,
OfferBoard CEO and CFIRA Chair Chris Tyrrell Presents at DC Growth Summit
Update, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Nov. 21, 2014, 12:33 PM), https://www.crowd
fundinsider.com/2014/11/56719-growth-summit-update-chris-tyrrell/.
34. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,388.
35. Andrea Rey-Marti et al., Crowdfunding and Social Entrepreneurship: Spotlight
on Intermediaries, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 1175, 1179 (2019).
36. Law of Promoting Business Financing arts. I–V (B.O.E. 2015, 4607) (Spain).
37. See id. (discussing participatory financing platforms).
38. See infra Part V.
39. See infra Part VI.

226

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9:2

and offer general conclusions and recommendations.
II. WHAT IS CROWDFUNDING?
Crowdfunding is an “increasingly widespread form of fundraising” where
a large number of individuals pool their money (usually through an Internet
platform) to support a specific goal.40 It has been used extensively for nonprofit fundraising, often with the offer of a non-monetary reward in exchange
for a contribution.41 As noted before, crowdfunding has been used
extensively to raise capital for ventures involving charities,42 movies,43 art
projects,44 and new product development.45
A. Consumer Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding has also become attractive to startup companies as a way
to raise general equity capital, as opposed to funding a particular project or
product.46 This use of crowdfunding, known as equity crowdfunding,
involves an entrepreneur or startup company selling debt, equity, or equitylike participations to a large number of small investors through an open call
for funding on an Internet platform.47
As of April 2012, thirty-nine Internet platforms in the United States,
United Kingdom, France, Australia, Spain, Belgium, and Ireland had raised
eighty-eight million dollars in equity financing.48 Most of this activity took
place in Internet sites located in Ireland, Australia, and the United
Kingdom.49 In the United States, “consumer crowdfunding” was not
available until 2016 because the SEC had not yet promulgated the
implementing regulations, which were not approved until November 16,
2015.50
40. Ahlers et al., supra note 1, at 955.
41. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 233 (describing five general categories of

crowdfunding that do not invite legal challenges).
42. See Druzin, supra note 4 (detailing crowdfunding efforts for veterans’ charities).
43. See McNary, supra note 5.
44. See ARTHENA, supra note 6 (discussing crowdfunding efforts for art projects).
45. See Pfeiffer, supra note 7.
46. See Howard Marks, What is Equity Crowdfunding?, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2018, 8:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/12/19/what-is-equity-crowd
funding/#2c75f8163b5d.
47. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 238–39.
48. Id. at 242 n.141.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 246–47; Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit
Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html.
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The Australian Small-Scale Offering Board (“ASSOB”) Internet platform
provides one example of how consumer crowdfunding works. First,
potential investors register with the website, provide certain personal
information, and confirm that they are aware of the risks associated with
investing in startups.51 Once registered, the potential investor can look at the
platform that provides general information about each investment.52 Once a
registered investor clicks on an individual investment, she can download
specific information about the company, located in an offering document,
which usually includes investment highlights, business model, market
analysis, details and purpose of the project, ownership structure, minimum
investment sought, and company management structure.53 To invest, the
investor makes a ten percent deposit, which is retained by the platform.54
The remaining ninety percent is owed when the minimum number of shares
noted in the call is sold.55 If the minimum number of shares is not sold within
the time frame specified in the offer, then the deposit is refunded.56
One of the largest consumer crowdfunding sites in the United States,
Wefunder,57 has a very simple investment process. A potential investor
seeking to invest no more than $2,000 opens an account online by submitting
her name and address and acknowledging that she understands the nature of
crowdfunding investments,58 especially their risk and lack of liquidity.59
Once she has opened an account, she may browse the website for investment
offerings and click to invest.60
A typical entry for a crowdfunding offer has a snapshot of the business, a
description of its product or products under development, a description of its
51. Creating Account, ENABLEFUNDING, https://www.enablefunding.com/ (follow
“Sign up” hyperlink; then follow “Register as an accredited investor” hyperlink) (last
visited May 1, 2020).
52. FAQs, ENABLEFUNDING, https://www.enablefunding.com/faqs/ (follow “I
would like to understand more about investing into unlisted potentially high-growth
opportunities. Are there seminars or presentations I can attend” hyperlink) (last visited
May 1, 2020).
53. Invest, ENABLEFUNDING, https://www.enablefunding.com (follow “Invest”
hyperlink to browse the different companies looking to raise funding).
54. Ahlers et al., supra note 1, at 964.
55. Id. at 964–65.
56. Id. at 965.
57. See WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/ (last visited May 1, 2020) (stating there
has been over $132.5 million raised by 560,469 investors).
58. See Getting Started, WEFUNDER, https://help.wefunder.com/#/getting-startedfor-investors (last visited May 1, 2020) (answering FAQs regarding investment risks).
59. Id.
60. See id. (discussing the investment process).

228

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9:2

management team and principal investors, a description of the principal risks
associated with the investment, and a link to Form C that the company filed
with the SEC.61
B. Accredited Investor Crowdfunding
A second crowdfunding alternative, used in the United States since 2012,
when the JOBS Act specifically permitted the practice, is what is often
referred to as “accredited investor crowdfunding.”62
Accredited investor crowdfunding has been described as a cyber-version
of the traditional “angel investor” network, where a small group of investors,
in addition to providing money, provide expertise, experience, advice
contracts, handholding, and empathy, often through repeated contact with
the startup.63 Within traditional “angel networks,” there is usually an
individual or a small group that provides most of this assistance.64 The rest
of the group usually relies on the judgment and research of the lead investor,
and its participation in the venture is essentially limited to furnishing
capital.65
Only “accredited investors” may participate in this type of crowdfunding
investment.66 As used in the United States, the term “accredited investor” is
defined as including individual investors with a minimum net worth of one
million dollars (excluding her primary residence) or an investor with annual
income of over $200,000 a year (or $300,000 a year if married), as well as
certain institutions with assets in excess of ten million dollars.67
Approximately 1,929 companies reported using accredited investor
crowdfunding between September of 2013 and September of 2014.68 These
offerings, made through platforms like AngelList and FundersClub, raised
approximately $118 billion during that time.69
61. See Explore, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/explore (last visited May 1,
2020) (listing the companies currently fundraising).
62. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
126 Stat. 306.
63. See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 575, 582–83.
64. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1418 (2008) (stating that angel investors provide 80 percent of
early-stage funding).
65. See id. at 1424 n.89.
66. See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 585 (stating AngelList “only
allows accredited investors who can help a startup in tangible ways”).
67. SEC Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2019).
68. Hobey, supra note 33.
69. Id.
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How does accredited investor crowdfunding work? This process can be
illustrated by examining two of the more well-known accredited investor
crowdfunding platforms, FundersClub70 and AngelList.71 For both of these
platforms, the SEC has concluded that, given their organization and
operations, they were not operating as broker-dealers and were, therefore,
not required to register as such under the securities laws.72 This finding
relieves accredited investor crowdfunding sites from the extensive cost and
regulatory burden that broker-dealers are subject to, giving them a
substantial competitive advantage.73
Only accredited investors may invest through AngelList and
FundersClub.74 These investors must first register with the website. Both
platforms will take affirmative steps before completing the registration of a
potential investor to confirm her accredited investor status.75 On both
platforms, the investor will invest through vehicles that will hold all of the
ownership and control rights in the investment completed through the
website.
Both FundersClub and AngelList have major differences in process and
structure.76 FundersClub has an investment committee that performs a due
70. FUNDERSCLUB, https://fundersclub.com/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
71. ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
72. See FundersClub, Inc. and FundersClub Mgmt. LLC, SEC No-Action Letter,

2013 WL 1229456 (Mar. 26, 2013); AngelList LLC and AngelList Advisors LLC, SEC
No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 1279194 (Mar. 28, 2013) (noting that AngelList does not
receive direct compensation and therefore is not operating as a broker-dealer).
73. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 603.
74. Help: Accreditation, ANGEL LINK, https://angel.co/help/accreditation (last
visited May 1, 2020); see How Do I Start Investing With Funders Club?, FUNDERSCLUB,
https://support.fundersclub.com/hc/en-us/articles/204968777-How-do-I-start-investingwith-FundersClub- (last visited May 1, 2020) (stating the requirements to become an
accredited investor on the websites).
75. See AngelList LLC and AngelList Advisors LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013
WL 1279194 (Mar. 28, 2013) (showing how in a similar manner, the FundersClub
website asks if you meet one or more of the requirements of an accredited investor); see
also FAQ, FUNDERSCLUB, https://support.fundersclub.com/hc/en-us/articles/20496
8777-How-do-I-start-investing-with-FundersClub- (last visited May 1, 2020) (informing
potential investors that if they do not meet the requirements of accredited investor status,
then they will not be able to invest in fundraising campaigns listed on FundersClub);
FundersClub, Inc. and FundersClub Management LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL
1229456 (Mar. 26, 2013); 15 U.S.C. 77d-1(a)(4) (2018) (requiring that intermediaries
take steps to positively affirm that each investor understands the various risks involved
in such an investment).
76. Compare FundersClub, Inc. and FundersClub Mgmt. LLC, SEC No-Action
Letter, 2013 WL 1229456 (Mar. 26, 2013) (explaining that members may submit a nonbinding interest inquiry on the website that allows members to withdraw until the fund
closes), with AngelList LLC and AngelList Advisors LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013
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diligence examination of the companies whose offerings it chooses to list.77
This investment committee also provides “angel services” to the companies
whose offerings it lists.78 AngelList, on the other hand, uses a “lead angel”
who performs the due diligence examination, vets investors, and advises the
company.79 Angel List refers to this type of transaction as an “angeladvised” transaction.80 AngelList investors can also invest in an “angelfollowed” transaction. In this transaction, the lead angel does not take an
active role with respect to advising the company and may not be aware that
he or she is being followed.81 In short, an investor can invest in a transaction
in which another individual (such as Marissa Mayer, CEO of YAHOO) is
investing82 merely because that investor thinks that this particular individual
is a knowledgeable investor.
III. THE CROWDFUNDING CONUNDRUM
Crowdfunding presents a series of issues and problems that affect startup
companies seeking financing, as well as potential investors and the state,
acting as regulator of the investment markets.83 In this section, I will
consider these issues and problems for consumer crowdfunding transactions
and for accredited investor crowdfunding transactions in that order.
A. Consumer Crowdfunding – The Company
Startup companies face a number of problems and issues in raising capital.
First, the principals of startup companies usually do not have sufficient
WL 1279194 (Mar. 28, 2013) (explaining that investors receive disclosure documents
after signing a non-binding interest letter).
77. About, FUNDERSCLUB, https://fundersclub.com/about/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
78. AngelList LLC and AngelList Advisors LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL
1279194 (Mar. 28, 2013).
79. See id. (noting that a lead angel is an accredited investor).
80. Help: Syndicates, ANGEL INVESTORS, https://angel.co/help/syndicates/angellistadvisors (last updated Dec. 22, 2018) (mentioning that mentoring might be a better fit
for a startup company because they can conceivably get the “right angel” with the “right”
set of experience, skills, and contacts to advise them; however, this lead angel might not
have as much experience as an investment committee that has vetted many different
proposed transactions).
81. AngelList LLC and AngelList Advisors LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL
1279194 (Mar. 28, 2013) (explaining that the lead angel investor does not need to advise
the Investment Vehicle or Portfolio Company).
82. See Investors, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/people/investors (last updated Dec.
22, 2018).
83. The Problems With Crowdfunding, VOA NEWS (Nov. 20, 2015), https://learn
ingenglish.voanews.com/a/perils-of-crowdfunding/3056706.html.

2020

RESOLVING THE CROWDFUNDING CONUNDRUM

231

experience raising money, and they and the company have little or no access
to bank credit.84 When these companies start seeking funding, they are
relatively small in size and do not necessarily want to raise large amounts of
money. Some of the traditional methods of raising capital, such as bank
loans or public offerings, are not available in this early stage.85 Even if they
were, these methods would generally be cost-prohibitive for a startup.86
Moreover, startup companies are unlikely to have most of the financial and
operational documentation required by professional investors or
underwriters, such as audited financial statements.87
Since the majority of startup firms fail in the short term,88 professional
investors, such as venture capitalists, are unlikely to be interested in a small
company unless the investment really looks like a “sure thing.” Even if the
professional investors would choose to invest in a startup, they are likely to
underprice the company’s stock in order to account for the risk associated
with the investment. This underpricing would be unattractive to the
company, since it would provide fewer funds than the company is seeking.
Since startup companies are unlikely to attract the interest of professional
investors, they are also unlikely to be able to raise the amount of capital they
need through financing techniques that do not involve a public offering, such
as a private placement.89 Crowdfunding therefore presents a highly attractive
funding alternative for startup companies for a number of reasons. First,
raising capital through smaller investments made by many non-professional
investors (who are excited by their company’s sales pitch) is more attractive
than seeking professional investors because these non-professional investors
are unlikely to be as demanding.90 Moreover, Internet investors are also
easier to find than professional investors since they find the company, and
84. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 880 (2011) (stating
that regulatory requirements of owning a small business outweigh traditional financing
methods).
85. The Benefits of Crowdfunding, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/learn/re
sources/guides/crowdfunding/the-benefits-of-crowdfunding (last visited May 1, 2020).
86. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 224–25.
87. Abraham J.B. Cable, Mad Money: Rethinking Private Placements, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 2253, 2280 n.115 (2014) (noting a difficulty that is overcome by
crowdsourcing).
88. MARMER ET AL., supra note 19.
89. See SEC Rule 506 Exemption, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2016); see also SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 120 (1953).
90. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 224–25 (“[C]rowdfunding could be an alternative to
angel investing and venture capital investing that can cost founders managerial
control.”).
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not vice versa. Additionally, crowdfunding allows startup companies to raise
capital simply and cheaply, with little or none of the costly formalities
currently required.91 This last characteristic is critical, since most startup
companies lack the knowledge, experience, and assets to hire experts to
prepare extensive documentation.
i. Investors
Potential investors who have little or no experience in the markets are in a
very different position from the companies that seek their funding and face
a number of distinctive problems and risks. First, these investors are
generally not financially sophisticated and do not have the expertise to
evaluate an investment of their own.92 Moreover, they also face information
asymmetry: inexperienced investors lack the resources and information
tools that professional investors utilize to evaluate investments.93 For
inexperienced investors, the cost and difficulty of acquiring this information
may be very high; even if they could acquire the information necessary, they
may not have the knowledge and experience to adequately evaluate the
potential investments.94 Because of this information, knowledge, and
experience asymmetry, retail investors are at a disadvantage and cannot
expect to have the same opportunities and returns as more sophisticated and
resourceful investors.95 When investing through Internet platforms,
investors are therefore highly susceptible to fraud.96
Investors interested in consumer crowdfunding offerings are not likely to
be high-net-worth individuals, and, therefore, they generally cannot afford
to invest a substantial amount of money. Any loss on these investments will
disproportionately affect these investors more than others since their loss will
be a larger part of their assets, and the loss is a real possibility for these
investors because investments in startups are very risky.97 Crowdfunding
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

The Benefits of Crowdfunding, supra note 85.
Cable, supra note 87, at 2297–98.
See id. at 2279–80.
Ahlers et al., supra note 1, at 957, 968.
Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U.L. REV. 461, 484–86 (2015)
(recommending that retail investors should not try to invest in individual securities but
instead should invest passively over the long term using low-cost index funds and mutual
funds that track the market widely because retail investors both have knowledge and
experience limitations).
96. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Crowdfunding Efforts Draw Suspicion, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 17, 2013, 6:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732378370
4578247380848394600.
97. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 251–52.
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investors also lack a convenient exit channel for their investment because
they are more likely to need their money in the short term.98 The lack of
liquidity for most startup investments makes the question of how an investor
gets her money back if she wants to leave a very difficult one to answer.99
On the other hand, crowdfunding enthusiasts point out that being part of
the investment crowd has at least two advantages. First, being part of a large
number of investors makes the analysis of information easier (the “wisdom
of the crowd”) and resolves some of the information asymmetry issues.100
Second, the crowd could be very effective in identifying and stopping fraud
since a large number of individuals with diverse skills and backgrounds are
all looking at the same data and communicating with each other.101 A
downside of the wisdom of the crowd, however, is the so-called “herd
effect,” where all members of the crowd only hear and internalize one point
of view, ignoring conflicting opinions.102
It appears that crowdfunding investors would prefer a system that would
allow them to invest small amounts easily and with limited costs, to
communicate and exchange information with fellow investors, and to
liquidate their investment in an expeditious manner. On the other hand, it
seems that these investors have a strong desire for the investment system to
be trustworthy and protect them from scams and fraud. This protection
would require a substantial (and costly) effort to vet these investments.103
ii. Intermediaries
Potential intermediaries, the websites that set up and manage the Internet
platforms for equity crowdfunding transactions, also face several problems,
the most critical one being profitability.104 How will the platform generate
revenue, and will this revenue be sufficient to cover all costs and generate a
98.
99.
100.
101.

Ahlers et al., supra note 1, at 971.
Id. at 963–64.
See Hurt, supra note 14, at 252 n. 207.
See id. at 257 (citing Steven M. Davidoff, Trepidation and Restrictions Leave
Crowdfunding Rules Weak, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 29, 2013, 5:10 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/trepidation-and-restrictions-leavecrowdfunding-rules-weak/).
102. The Herd Effect in Financial Markets, QUANTDARE (Feb. 11, 2017),
https://quantdare.com/the-herd-effect-in-financial-markets/ (explaining that although
investors are aware of the actions of their predecessors, each investor ultimately makes
their own decisions and can sometimes ignore signals from their predecessors).
103. E.g., Hurt, supra note 14, at 241 (explaining that these institutions tried to avoid
regulation by registering with the SEC).
104. Id. at 237.
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profit? Possible sources of revenue include listing fees for sellers,
subscription fees, commissions, and equity stakes in firms whose securities
are listed.105 However, given the typical small size of crowdfunding
offerings and transactions, these fees and commissions are likely to be
small.106 Therefore, increasing the volume of listings and transactions and
keeping all costs (including regulatory costs) down is essential.
Intermediaries are unlikely to tolerate high levels of regulation, since high
levels of regulation will increase compliance costs. 107
Given the inexperience and information asymmetry of both sellers and
buyers in a crowdfunding market along with the high rate of failure of startup
companies, it is more than likely that many crowdfunded investments will
be unsuccessful.108 In fact, some critics claim that crowdfunding could help
bad businesses get off the ground before they inevitably fail.109 There is also
a real risk of fraud in a market full of unsophisticated investors.110 This
situation presents potential liability to an intermediary, which could find
itself the target of litigation by an unhappy investor, who may think that the
listing of a company’s offerings in the platform represents some guarantee
of solvency or stability.
Careful vetting of all potential listings by the intermediary may minimize
this risk, so that only the “least risky” and “safest” offerings are listed on the
site.111 This vetting process is costly and may result in the listing of fewer
investments, reducing the profitability of the platform. Another possible
risk-reduction technique would include careful vetting of all potential
investors using the platform by its intermediary, to ensure that the investors
105. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 227.503(a) (2015) (detailing disqualifying provisions);
id. § 227.100(b)(1) (describing the applicability of the crowdfunding exception); id. §
227.300(b) (providing requirements for intermediaries).
106. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 84, at 930 (stating that regulatory schemes
may have too remote of benefits for crowdfunding investments because of the small
number of units and the small aggregate dollar value).
107. See id. at 930.
108. See Cable, supra note 87, at 2279–80; see also Amy Cortese, The Crowdfunding
Crowd is Anxious, N.Y. TIMES (updated Feb. 20, 2013, 2:18 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/id/100356643.
109. Cortese, supra note 108 (stating that both startups and crowdfunding present high
risks of fraud and failure).
110. Eaglesham, supra note 96 (reporting a study from the National Association of
Securities Administration, which found that 9,000 website names containing the word
“crowdfunding”, and of the 2,000 that were reviewed, 200 merited further investigation
to determine if they were fraudulent).
111. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 244 (citing the Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d-1(a)(8)–(12) (2018).
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understand the general risks of investing in the stock market and the
particular risks of investing in startup companies. Investor vetting is also
likely to be costly, and online investor vetting may be ineffective in reducing
the risk of disappointed investor litigation.
A potential crowdfunding intermediary will therefore be entering a
business with potentially high costs, low profit margins, and a high risk of
potential liability. This business model is not a very attractive one.112
However, investment banking firms may be natural candidates for
crowdfunding intermediaries. Since they are experienced in the securities
business and have an established online, sales, regulatory, and compliance
infrastructure, they will have much lower setup and operation costs.
Crowdfunding would open up a previously unserved additional market
niche, which may, in the long term, expand a firm’s business into other
areas.113 It may also, however, increase a firm’s exposure to liability, given
the riskiness of crowdfunding investments.
iii. Markets and Regulators
Markets and their regulators, on the other hand, face a tough situation.
They are faced with two contradictory missions: facilitating the acquisition
of capital by businesses and protecting investors (and the market) from fraud
and manipulation.114 Given the nature of the crowdfunding process and its
actors, fulfilling both missions is very difficult. In order to facilitate the
acquisition of capital by startup businesses through crowdfunding, regulators
must make the process simple, quick, and low cost. This approach would
involve implementing simple forms, limited disclosures, and low fees.
Protecting investors and the market from fraud and manipulation, on the
other hand, may be achieved by educating investors, requiring full disclosure
of all material facts regarding the company and the offering,115 and
establishing time constraints on sales to allow both potential investors and
the market time to absorb and evaluate the disclosed information and
appropriately price the offering,116 or limiting investments for small

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id. at 245–46.
See id. at 222.
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 84, at 927–28.
Securities Act of 1933 § 5.
See id. (requiring the issuer make the following information available to the
potential investor within twenty-one days of the sale: administrative, financial condition
and offerings, use of the proceeds, target amounts, the price of public securities, and
ownership).
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investors.117 These tasks may be delegated to the market itself118 or, in the
case of crowdfunding, to the intermediary. Unfortunately, utilizing these
investor protection mechanisms adds time, cost, and complexity to the
capital acquisition process.119 The easier a regulator makes it for a startup
company to raise capital by deregulating the process, the less protection
investors have against fraud and manipulation.120 Conversely, the more
protection investors have against fraud and manipulation, the higher the cost
and difficulty of raising capital. These two interests need to be balanced, so
that companies can partake in a capital acquisition process that provides
them reasonable access to capital, and investors have an appropriate level of
protection against fraud and manipulation. Unfortunately, the devil is in the
details.
B. Accredited Investor Crowdfunding
Investing in startup companies that seek capital from accredited investors
through crowdfunding is also a risky endeavor.121 These companies face a
number of issues that are different from those companies seeking capital
through consumer crowdfunding.
i. Companies
As noted above, a company seeking capital through accredited investor
crowdfunding would list its securities on an Internet platform set up for that
purpose.122 Under the U.S. securities laws, it is the company’s responsibility

117. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2) (2019).
118. See NYSE Regulation, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, https://www.nyse.com/

regulation (last visited May 1, 2020) (explaining that certain federal securities rules are
enforced by the financial industry itself, in addition to compliance with the rules of any
exchange that a company is listed on; NYSE Regulation, for example, works with the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to enforce compliance by the companies listed
on the New York Stock Exchange with federal rules and exchange rules meant to protect
investors).
119. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 84, at 911 (discussing the costliness and
timeliness of registration).
120. See id. at 936–37 (highlighting the potential for fraud in unregulated markets,
even though it would be easier to raise capital with fewer regulatory barriers).
121. See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 573–74 (explaining that the
risks of accredited investor crowdfunding generally involve lack of capital, extreme
levels of uncertainty because of the nature of the startup itself and information
asymmetry, lack of experience, and large agency costs).
122. See supra notes 74–76 (describing online platforms for accredited investor
crowdfunding).
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to verify an investor’s accredited status.123 In crowdfunding transactions, the
company has to rely on the work done by the platform to verify that all
investors are accredited investors.124 This means that the company must take
“reasonable steps” to ensure that the platform is appropriately determining
that its investors are accredited.125
A company seeking to raise capital through accredited investor
crowdfunding in the United States must also determine whether or not the
platform through which it lists its securities for sale is required to register as
a broker-dealer under the securities laws.126 A company that sells securities
through an unregistered broker-dealer, whether through the Internet or not,
gives its buyers the right to buy back their shares at the price for which they
were sold.127 This outcome may be a source of economic disaster for the
company. 128
On the other hand, accredited investor crowdfunding is an attractive
option for a startup company. As discussed above, the company does not
have to incur the costs, in regards to both time and money, of disclosing
information to individual investors, issuing stock to them, and managing the
relationship.129 Instead, they deal with either an investment committee or a
sophisticated and experienced investor whose hand they do not have to hold
and who will provide valuable mentoring and networking.130 Moreover,
since the individuals who invest in accredited investor crowdfunding tend to
be wealthy and/or sophisticated, the likelihood of litigation from an unhappy
investor who may not have understood the nature of the risks which he was
undertaking might be less than in consumer crowdfunding.
Accredited investors who participate in crowdfunding are also investing
in highly risky ventures that are highly illiquid and long-term investments.131
123. See Kristen A. Young, Compliance With the Securities Laws in Crowdfunded
Securities Offerings: Startups It’s Your Responsibility!, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581,
585 (2015); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2014).
124. See Young, supra note 123, at 588.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 592.
127. See id. at 591–92.
128. See id. at 601–05 (detailing the Neogenix Oncology, Inc. case in which a
startup’s issuance of common stock through unregistered dealers, and the threat of
rescission by its investors, resulted in enough risk to prevent the startup from raising
sufficient capital and forced it into bankruptcy).
129. See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 585–86.
130. Id. at 583; see supra Part III.A (discussing the factors making crowdfunding —
though not necessarily accredited investor crowdfunding — attractive to startups).
131. See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3389, 3401, 3428 (2013).
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Indeed, the investor receives a return at some point (usually determined by
someone else) and, if she is lucky, will obtain a profit. She generally does
not have the ability to dispose of her individual interest and has little or no
say on the timing of this disposal.132 Moreover, information asymmetry is
also a problem for the investor regarding the nature of the investment.133
These are opaque investments held by an intermediary that does not provide
the kind of information or analysis typically available for other types of
investments.134 A more serious issue, as many commentators in the United
States have noted, is the fact that even accredited investors are often unable
to understand the risks involved in investing in a startup.135
In U.S. securities law, the accredited investor concept is based on the
assumption that, because certain investors are “sophisticated” (a term that
lacks a clear definition), they are thus able to understand the nature of the
risk.136 Therefore, since they are wealthy, and able to assume the risk of
failure, they do not need the protection of securities law.137 This concept has
evolved from one where the investor needed to be both wealthy and
sophisticated138 to one where the investor has to be wealthy alone.139
Currently, an accredited investor is an individual with a net worth of over
132. See id. at 3410, 3428 (discussing the lack of investors’ right to sell and the risk
of potentially losing everything).
133. See id. at 3408 (accentuating concerns about information asymmetries arising in
these markets because “buyers and sellers may have vastly different levels of
information”).
134. See id. at 3405, 3428.
135. See id. at 3422–23 (pointing out that wealthy does not necessarily equate with
sophisticated).
136. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125–26 (1953).
137. See id. at 125; see also Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort,
Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1583 (2013).
138. See Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933:
“Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering,” Securities Act
Release No. 5487, 4 SEC Docket 154 (Apr. 23, 1974).
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013). One commentator has noted that several
flaws exist with a wealth-based test for financial sophistication. Net wealth itself may
not be an accurate indication of the investor’s sophistication or ability to bear the risk.
Wealth alone is not a guarantee that an investor will be unable to avoid opportunistic
brokers or fraudulent schemes. Furthermore, the current accredited investor definition
is both over- and under-inclusive in scope. Otherwise financially knowledgeable
investors are deemed unaccredited because they do not meet the minimum wealth
requirements, and, conversely, financial novices may be deemed accredited merely by
the possession of wealth. See Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering
the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U.L. REV.
733, 748 (2009).

2020

RESOLVING THE CROWDFUNDING CONUNDRUM

239

$1,000,000 or who has over $200,000 in yearly income,140 and the amounts
have not been adjusted for inflation. So, upper middle-class investors,
including senior citizens with large pension funds, may meet the asset or
income requirement of the rule and be able to be classified as “wealthy” and
thus accredited investors.141 Unfortunately, wealth alone does not
necessarily indicate that an investor has the ability to appreciate the nature
of the risk.142 Moreover, given the complicated nature (or opacity) of some
investments,143 anecdotal evidence suggests that the ability of most
“accredited investors” to be able to fend for themselves is a fiction.144
This distinction is especially critical since, as a condition of being
exempted from registration as a broker-dealer, accredited investor
crowdfunding platforms are not allowed to give any investment advice to
their investors.145 Moreover, the wider the solicitation and the larger the
number of passive investors, the greater the possibility of active-investor
opportunism or fraud at the expense of passive investors.146
IV. CROWDFUNDING IN THE U.S. REGULATORY SYSTEM
A. The U.S. Regulatory System Before the JOBS Act
Under federal securities law, the general rule is that any sale or offer of a

140. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6).
141. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 137, at 1611–12, 1618 (discussing the

SEC’s “wealth alone” requirement — which was promulgated on the assumption that
wealthier investors are more familiar with financial risks — and explaining how seniors
with retirement savings meeting the regulatory thresholds are particularly vulnerable).
142. See id. at 1161.
143. See The Con of the Century, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.econ
omist.com/node/12818310 (discussing the Madoff scandal in which many extremely
wealthy investors — indeed, even some banks, such as Santander and HSBC — invested
without much complaint in what turned out to be an enormous Ponzi scheme); see also
Kurt Eichenwald, Scandal’s Cost to Prudential Tops $1.4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22,
1995),
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/22/business/scandal-s-cost-for-prudentialtops-1.4-billion.html (discussing the Prudential-Bache Securities scandal in which
limited partnerships were fraudulently sold to hundreds of thousands of people).
144. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 137, at 1617.
145. See 17 C.F.R § 227.402 (2019); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(81)(a) (2018); 15
U.S.C § 77d(a)(6)(2018).
146. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 137, at 1617 (“[A]s distributors of
securities move from bargaining with a small group of buyers to mass marketing directed
at a large, dispersed group of well-off retail investors, the likelihood of successful
opportunism grows . . . the presence of a critical mass of sophisticated buyers will reduce
the likelihood of opportunism even if we assume some unsophisticated buyers.”).
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security (a very broadly defined term)147 in interstate commerce may not be
made unless the issuer registers these securities with the SEC by filing a
registration statement.148 The registration statement requires disclosure of a
substantial amount of information about the company and the offering in a
highly stylized form, including audited financial statements.149
The purpose of this requirement is multifaceted: to allow the investor to
make an informed decision on an investment by giving her all material
information about the company; to allow the market to make an accurate
pricing decision based on the disclosed material information; and to prevent
fraud.150 At the same time, issuers are trying to raise capital as cheaply,
quickly, and simply as possible.
For most startup companies, registration is not feasible for a number of
reasons. First, the stock distribution method in the United States generally
requires the services of one or more investment banks as underwriters in
initial offerings of registered securities.151 Since underwriters take a
substantial financial risk in these transactions, they tend to be quite selective
in choosing companies, and they exclude most applicants.152 Second, the
process is extremely expensive and includes numerous fees and
commissions, so it is not the most cost-effective approach for raising small
amounts of money.153
There are a number of exemptions to the registration requirements that can
be used to sell securities without the filing of a registration statement.154
These exemptions tend to be considerably more cost-effective and require
less formalities.155 However, these exemptions are generally not feasible for
startups that are not financed by professional investors.156 Some exemptions
are still costly and complicated and therefore not feasible for a startup to
use.157 Most exemptions are also limited to a small number of sophisticated
147. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (2018).
148. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1).
149. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.501-512 (2019); see also SEC FORM S-1 REGISTRATION

STATEMENT UNDER SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms1.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
150. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 4–5 (1933).
151. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 225.
152. See id. at 225–27.
153. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2012).
154. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 505, 506 (2019).
155. See Bradford, supra note 153, at 48.
156. See id.
157. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251–63.
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investors.158 Other exemptions limit the number of investors or forbid
general solicitation or advertisement, which would preclude the sale to a
large number of investors or the use of an Internet platform.159
Intermediaries involved in the sale of securities are generally required under
federal securities laws to register as an investment advisor or investment
company,160 which would make them subject to a substantial regulatory
framework and would bring additional costs and potential liability.161 The
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws also create a substantial amount
of risk, both to the intermediaries and the sellers. Some of this potential
liability becomes criminal in certain situations.162
B. The JOBS Act
The JOBS Act was passed by Congress in late 2012.163 It created two
different types of crowdfunding: one (“Section 506C crowdfunding”) would
apply only to wealthy individuals who qualify as accredited investors
(referred to in this Article as “accredited investor crowdfunding”),164 and one
that can be used for crowdfunding from individuals who have a lower annual
income or net worth (referred to in this Article as “consumer
crowdfunding”).165 The SEC, in accordance with a mandate set forth in the
statute,166 has issued regulations to implement its consumer crowdfunding
provisions.167
One question that arises is why the JOBS Act creates two different
crowdfunding systems instead of one.168 I believe that the statute tried to
158. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
159. See id.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1) (2019); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §

3(a)(80), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2019).
161. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.300, 227.400 (2018).
162. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2018);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2018); Securities Act of 1933
§ 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2018).
163. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong.
(2012).
164. Id. § 201.
165. Id. §§ 302(a)(6)-(b)(5).
166. Id. § 602.
167. See Crowdfunding, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Release Nos. 33-9974
and 34-76324 10 (Oct. 30, 2015).
168. Compare Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §
201, 126 Stat. 306, 313–15 (2012) (codifying accredited investor rules), with Jumpstart
Our Business (JOBS) Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 302(a)(6)–(b)(5), 126 Stat.
306, 315–18 (2012) (codifying exceptions to those rules).
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solve the crowdfunding conundrum in two different ways because it
responds to two different sets of problems. In the case of accredited investor
crowdfunding, there was already a system in place that allowed individuals,
perceived to be sophisticated investors, the ability to invest in startups
through the private placement mechanism. The problem was that they were
not allowed to do so through the Internet.169 The Act therefore created a
technical fix to allow private placement investments to be offered to
accredited investors through the Internet.170 With consumer crowdfunding,
Congress understood that there was no mechanism in place allowing nonsophisticated investors to invest in startups through the Internet.171 In order
to do so, a new market and its underlying infrastructure needed to be created.
In the section below, I examine the statutory and regulatory framework
that has enabled the creation of accredited investor and consumer
crowdfunding.
i. Accredited Investor Crowdfunding
Title II of the JOBS Act permits the use of general solicitation (including
the use of the Internet) to raise capital through private placements, as long as
the investments are offered to accredited investors.172 In addition to
permitting the use of general solicitation in private placements, Title II of the
JOBS Act provides relief from the requirement that an online platform
register as a broker-dealer under the securities laws.173 This exemption
applies to private placements made under Regulation D of the 1933
Securities Act if:
(a) that person maintains a platform or mechanism that permits the offer,
sale, purchase or negotiation of or with respect to securities, or permits
general solicitations, general advertisements or similar or related activities
by issuers of such securities, whether online, in person or through any
other means; (b) that person, or any person associated with that person,
co-invests in such securities, or (c) that person or any person associated
169. See Crowdfunding, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Release Nos. 33-9974
and 34-76324 7 (Oct. 30, 2015) (eliminating rules for the sale of securities that would
have required the seller to register as a broker).
170. See id. at 7–8 (explaining the background of the new rules).
171. Id.
172. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act § 201(a). See generally 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a) (2019) (stating accredited investors are individual investors with a
minimum net worth of one million dollars excluding primary residence, or an investor
with annual income of over $200,000 ($300,000 joint income for married couples) as
well as certain institutions with assets in excess of five million dollars).
173. Id. § 201(b)(1).
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with that person provides ancillary services in connection with those
securities.174

The exemption only applies if:

(a) such person and each person associated with it does not receive
compensation in connection with the purchase or sale; (b) that person does
not possess customer funds or securities in connection with the purchase
or sale of such a security; and (c) the person is not statutorily disqualified
under Section 3(a) (39) of [the Act].175

As noted above, companies seeking capital through accredited investor
crowdfunding face two regulatory risks, which require that they ascertain
that investors participating in the offering qualify as accredited investors and
that the platform through which they are seeking to list their securities for
sale is not required to register as a broker-dealer under the securities laws.176
Moreover, a serious issue arises regarding investors in accredited investor
crowdfunding transactions. These are risky investments that are also highly
illiquid, complex, and opaque. Given the complexity of these investments
and the large number of individuals who qualify as accredited investors
under current law, investors may not, by their wealth alone, have the ability
to appreciate the nature of the risk they are undertaking or determine whether
a potential investment is unsuitable for them.177 I, therefore, believe that the
definition of “accredited investor” in Rule 501 of the Act178 should be
amended to provide that, in order to be considered an accredited investor, a
person should, either by herself or through the help of an advisor, have
sufficient knowledge and experience to understand the nature of the
potential investments that she is considering.
ii. Consumer Crowdfunding
Title III of the JOBS Act creates a new exemption from the registration
requirements in the 1933 Act (Section 4(6)) for transactions by an issuer that
meet a number of criteria.179
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d (c)(1)(A)–(C) (2019).
175. Id. §§ (c)(2)(A)–(C).
176. See, e.g., Crowdfunding, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Release Nos. 33-

9974 and 34-76324 7 (Oct. 30, 2015) (eliminating rules for the sale of securities that
would have required the seller to register as a broker and discussing the regulatory
requirements of accredited investor crowdfunding).
177. See supra notes 139–146 (discussing the risks associated with the definition of
accredited investor).
178. 17 CFR § 230.501(a) (2019).
179. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
§§ 302(a)(6)(A)–(D), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (detailing issuer exemption requirements
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a. Provisions relating to sellers of securities
Sellers of securities (“issuers”) who seek to utilize this exemption may not
currently crowdfund more than one million dollars in securities sold in a
twelve-month period.180 They must also file certain categories of financial
and business information with the SEC and provide it to investors and
brokers, or the funding platform. Financial information required to be
disclosed includes: for solicitations of $100,000 or less, the last two tax
returns and financial statements certified by the chief executive officer; for
offerings of $100,000 to $500,000, financial statements reviewed by an
independent certified public accountant; and for offerings over $500,000,
audited financial statements.181 Additional information that must be
disclosed includes the stated purpose and intended use of the proceeds, the
target offering amount, the price of the security and the method for
determining the price, and the description of the ownership and capital
structure of the issuer.182 Issuers may not advertise the terms of the offering
in any way, except through notices directing investors to an offering platform
or broker.183
Issuers engaging in crowdfunded offerings are also required to file
operational reports and financial statements as the SEC determines by
regulation, at least annually.184 The issuers may be subject to administrative,
civil, or criminal liability for any fraud, material misstatements, or omissions
in any disclosed information.185 Investors may also recover damages from
the issuer in a crowdfunded offering for material misrepresentations and
omissions made by the issuer.186
Securities issued pursuant to a crowdfunding transaction are restricted and
may not be transferred for a year unless they are transferred to the issuer, an
accredited investor, as part of a registered offering, or to a family member or
equivalent, in connection with a death or divorce.187
under the JOBS Act).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2018). On March 4, 2020, the SEC proposed
increasing this amount to five million dollars. See Release Nos. 33-10763, 34-88321;
File No. S7-05-20, Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment
Opportunities by Improving Access to Private Markets (March 4, 2020)) [hereinafter
“2020 Proposed Regulatory Amendments”] at § 227.100(a)(1), p. 289.
181. 15 U.S.C.§§ 77d-1(b)(1)(A)–(D) (2018).
182. Id. §§ (b)(1)(E)–(H).
183. Id. § (b)(2).
184. Id. § (b)(4).
185. Id. §§ (c)(1)-(2).
186. Id. §§ (c)(2)(A)-(B).
187. Id. § (e).
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b. Provisions relating to investors in securities
Title III limits the aggregate amount of securities that may be sold to any
investor in a crowdfunded offering to not exceed in a twelve-month period
either the greater of $2,000 or five percent of the annual income or net worth
of an investor whose income or net worth is less than $100,000, or the lesser
of ten percent of the annual income or net worth (not to exceed $107,000) if
the investor’s annual income or net worth exceeds $100,000.188
Each investor in a crowdfunded offering is required by the statute to
review certain investor education information set forth in the offering
platform. The investor will affirm that she is aware of the risk of losing the
entire investment and that she can bear such a loss and answer questions
showing an understanding of risk generally, and the risk of illiquidity in
particular.189
c. Provisions relating to intermediaries (Platforms)
The statute also provides that any person acting as an intermediary in a
crowdfunding transaction must register either with the SEC as a broker or a
funding platform or with an applicable exchange or self-regulatory
organization.190
The statute further imposes several additional
responsibilities on an intermediary.191 First, the intermediary must ensure
that each investor reviews the investor education information and affirms
that she is aware of the risk of loss of the entire investment and that she can
bear such a loss, and answers questions showing an understanding of risk
generally, and the risk of illiquidity in particular.192 Furthermore, the
intermediary must provide to its clients any information provided by the
issuer no later than twenty-one days before securities are sold.193
Intermediaries are also required to take a number of steps to reduce the risk
of fraud in crowdfunded transactions.194 Intermediaries must ensure that all
offering proceeds are provided to the issuer only when the aggregate capital
raised is equal to or greater than a target offering amount and allow the
188. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2018). The 2020 Proposed Regulatory Amendments
would change this formula to the greater of 10 percent of the annual income or net worth
of an investor whose annual income or net worth exceeds $107,000. 2020 Proposed
Amendments, supra note 180, at §227.100 (a)(2)(ii), p.289.
189. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(4) (2018).
190. Id. § 77d-1 (a)(1).
191. Id. §§ 77d-1(a)(4)–(7), (9)–(11).
192. Id. § 77d-1(a)(4).
193. Id. § 77d-1(a)(6).
194. Id. §§ 77d-1 (5), (9)–(11).
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investors to cancel their investment.195
C. Regulation Crowdfunding
The JOBS Act required the SEC to issue regulations to implement the
consumer crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act no later than 270 days
from the date of its enactment in April 2012.196 In meeting this legislative
mandate, the SEC issued draft regulations on November 5, 2013 (“the
proposed regulations”).197 In accordance with U.S. administrative law,
comments on these draft regulations were solicited from interested parties.198
These draft regulations were finalized and published on November 16,
2015.199 They are known as Regulation CF and became effective on May
16, 2016.200 These regulations appear in Title 17, Part 200 of the Code of
Federal Regulations.201
i. Provisions relating to sellers of securities
Regulation CF is quite extensive and greatly expands the statutory
requirements relating to issuers. For example, issuers are required to file the
information under Title II of the JOBS Act (and additional categories of
information added by the regulations) with the SEC and with its funding
platform in an Offering Statement filed on a new SEC Form C.202 The issuer
is required to amend this Offering Circular whenever there is a material
change, update, or addition and must file progress reports after completing
50 percent and 100 percent of its intended funding target.203 Moreover,
issuers must continue to file annual reports of their operations and financial
statements on a yearly basis until the company becomes public, repurchases
all of the crowdfunded shares, or liquidates the business.204
Regulation CF also spells out the content of the notices that issuers may

195. Id. § 77d-1(7).
196. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c),

126 Stat. 306, 320 (2012) (codifying the rulemaking requirements).
197. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428, 66428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).
198. Id.
199. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 15, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R pts.
200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 274).
200. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66428.
201. See id.
202. 17 C.F.R. § 227.201 (2016); 17 C.F.R. § 227.203 (2019).
203. 17 C.F.R. § 227.203(a)(3)(i) (2019).
204. Id. § 227.202(b).
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use in directing investors to the intermediary’s platform.205 As set forth
therein, the information that may be disclosed in these notices is very
limited.206
The crowdfunding exemption also does not apply to issuers, officers,
directors, shareholders with over twenty percent ownership stakes, or their
partners or paid solicitors, who have violated or failed to comply with federal
securities, banking, and bankruptcy regulations or who have been barred
from a registered national securities exchange or national securities
association.207
The regulations also make it clear that consumer
crowdfunding exemptions do not apply to issuers who are not organized
under the laws of a state or territory of the United States, therefore limiting
the availability of crowdfunding only to U.S. companies.208
Lastly, issuers of securities sold through a crowdfunding platform may not
transfer them for one year after purchase, unless the securities are transferred
to the issuer, to an accredited investor, as part of a registered offering, or to
a family member under certain circumstances set forth in the proposed
regulations.209
ii. Provisions relating to intermediaries and transactions
The regulation imposes a number of requirements and responsibilities on
crowdfunding intermediaries. First, each crowdfunding platform must either
register as a broker under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or as a
funding platform in accordance with the regulation.210 The intermediaries
must also become members of a national securities association, which means
that they would be subject to the disciplinary and dispute resolution practices
of that association, which might include an obligation to arbitrate disputes.211
Foreign entities may register as a funding platform under certain
conditions. First, there must be an information-sharing agreement in place
between the SEC and the competent regulator in the jurisdiction in which the
proposed foreign platform is registered. Second, the platform must appoint
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71390.
17 C.F.R. § 227.204(a) (2019).
Id. § 227.503(a).
Id. § 227.100(b)(1).
Id. § 227.501(a).
See SEC, Registration of Funding Platforms (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.sec.
gov/divisions/marketreg/tmcompliance/fpregistrationguide.htm.
211. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.300(a); see, e.g., FINRA, Rule 12100-01 https://www.finra.
org/arbitration-mediation/printable-code-arbitration-procedure-12000#12100 (defining
terms used).
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an agent for the service of process in the United States and certify that it is
authorized, under the law of its jurisdiction, to provide the SEC with access
to its books and records, submit to onsite inspections and examinations, and
then must in fact permit such inspections and examinations by SEC
representatives.212
Regulation CF also requires that intermediaries must deny access to the
site to issuers in three different situations.213 First, the intermediaries must
deny access if they have a reasonable basis for believing that they or their
principals are subject to disqualification under the regulations.214 At a
minimum, they must conduct a background and securities enforcement
regulatory history check on each issuer and its principals.215 Second, the
platform must deny an issuer access to the platform if it has a reasonable
basis for believing that the offering presents the potential for fraud or
otherwise raises concerns regarding investor protection.216 Last, the platform
must deny access if it believes that it is unable to adequately or effectively
assess the risk of fraud of the issuer or its potential offering. If the
intermediary, after the offering, becomes aware of information that causes it
to believe that the issuer or the offering present the potential for fraud, then
the intermediary must remove and cancel the offering from its platform and
refund any investor funds.217
Individuals wishing to invest in a crowdfunded offering must open an
account with the intermediary prior to investment. As part of the accountopening process, the intermediary must give potential investors information
that explains the investment process, the restrictions on resale of securities,
the information issuers are required to provide, investment limitations, as
well as risk and suitability criteria.218 The intermediary may not, however,
offer investment advice or recommendations to any potential investors.219
The regulation is quite specific with regard to the issue of intermediaries
holding financial interests in the securities of the companies they list.
212. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.400(f).
213. See SEC, Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small. Entity Compliance Guide for.

Crowdfunding Intermediaries (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/market
reg/tmcompliance/cfintermediaryguide.htm.
214. See Dept. of Enforcement v. Dreamfunded Marketplace, LLC, Disciplinary
Proceeding No. 2017053428201 (June 5, 2019), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/
files/2019-07/OHO_DreamFunded_2017053428201.pdf.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.301.
218. See id. § 227.302(b)(1).
219. See id. § 227.402(a).
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Officers, directors, or partners of an intermediary may not have a financial
interest in any issuer selling securities on the website or receive a financial
interest in the issuer as compensation for services provided to the listed
company.220 An intermediary may, however, compensate a third party for
referring a person to the funding platform, as long as the third party does not
provide the intermediary with personally identifiable information of any
potential investor and the compensation is not based, directly or indirectly,
on the purchase or sale of a security offered on or through the intermediary’s
platform.221 An intermediary may also pay or receive compensation to or
from a broker or dealer for services provided in connection with the offer or
sale of securities by the intermediary.222 It may receive a financial interest
in the entity whose securities are listed for sale on its website if the interest
consists of securities of the same class as those being sold, which are given
as compensation for services provided to the listing company in connection
with the offer.223
Prior to listing an offering on the website, intermediaries are required to
have a reasonable basis for believing that an issuer seeking listing on the
website complies with the requirements of the securities laws and
regulations.224 The intermediaries must also have a reasonable basis for
believing that the issuers listing on the website have established means to
keep accurate books and records of the holders of the securities that it would
offer and sell.225 The regulations do provide that intermediaries may rely on
issuers’ representations about these facts.226 Intermediaries must post on
their website all information required to be submitted by the issuer under the
statute and regulation for a period of twenty-one days before any securities
are sold and retain it until the offer is either completed or cancelled.227
The regulations also require intermediaries to have a reasonable basis for
believing that the investor satisfies the investment requirements established
by the statute.228 In order to do so, they must obtain the following from the
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See id. § 227.300(b).
See id. § 227.402(b)(6).
See id. §§ 227.402(b)(6)–(8).
See id. § 227.300(b).
See SEC, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Regulation Crowdfunding and
Intermediary Requirements (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/
tmcompliance/cfportal-faqs.htm.
225. See id.
226. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.301(a)–(b).
227. See id. § 227.303(a).
228. See SEC, supra note 224.
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investor: (1) a representation that the investor has reviewed the educational
materials delivered as part of the account opening process, understands that
the entire amount may be lost, and that the investor is in a financial condition
to bear such a loss; and (2) a completed questionnaire that demonstrates the
investor’s understanding of the restrictions on his or her ability to cancel an
investment commitment and obtain a return of his or her investment, the
difficulty of reselling the investment, and of the nature of the risks involved
in the transaction.229
An intermediary must also provide on its platform a communications
channel through which investors can communicate with each other and with
representatives of the issuer about offerings made available on the platform.
It may not participate in this channel other than to establish posting
guidelines and remove abusive or fraudulent communications.230 An
intermediary may apply objective criteria to limit the securities offered
through its platform as long as those criteria meet the requirements of the
regulation.231 It may also provide search functions on the website that will
allow potential investors to search, sort, or categorize potential investments,
as long as those search functions operate according to the objective criteria
set forth in the regulation.232 As noted above, an intermediary may not give
investment advice or recommendations about investments listed on its
website, solicit offers to buy the securities offered, or compensate any person
for doing so.233
An investor in a crowdfunded transaction may cancel an investment
commitment for any reason until forty-eight hours prior to the deadline
identified in the issuer’s offering materials.234 An investor may also cancel
an investment later than that if there is a material change to the terms of the
offering or to the information provided by the issuer.235 In such a case, the
intermediary must send a notice of the material change and state that the
investment commitment will be cancelled unless the investor reconfirms
it.236
The regulation also imposes substantial compliance and recordkeeping
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See 17 C.F.R. § 227.303(b).
See id. § 227.303(c) (outlining communication channels).
See id.
See id. § 227.402(b)(3) (outlining criteria).
Id. § 227.402(b)(3)(a). As noted above, there are some exceptions to this
prohibition. See supra notes 216–21 for the rules on intermediaries advising investors.
234. 17 C.F.R. § 227.304(a).
235. Id. § 227.304(c)(1).
236. Id. §§ 227.304(a), (c)(1).
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obligations on the funding platforms.237 For example, the platforms must
implement written compliance policies to ensure that the platform is in
compliance with federal securities law, money laundering regulations, and
privacy laws.238 They must also make and preserve for five years a large
number of records relating to their operations, including all records relating
to investors, issuers, and transactions, educational materials, and notices,
agreements, monthly and quarterly transaction summaries, and copies of all
communications that occur on or through its platform.239
D. The Consumer Crowdfunding Experience in the United States
i. Statistics
The SEC statistics show that, in the first year of Regulation CF’s operation
(from May 2016 through May 2017), 105 consumer crowdfunding
campaigns were reported to the SEC as completed after having successfully
met their minimum fundraising goal.240 These successful Regulation CF
campaigns raised more than thirty million dollars.241 Non-SEC sources have
since reported 292 successful campaigns, which raised $92,055,260.242 They
further added that the average number of investors per closed offering in
2016 was 331, with an average commitment of $833 per investor.243
ii. Reactions to Regulation CF
The reaction to the consumer crowdfunding experience in the United
States since 2016 has not been positive. There appears to be a consensus
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. § 227.403(a).
See id.
Id. §§ 227.404(a)(1)–(3), (5)–(8).
LINDSAY M. ABATE, OFF. OF ADVOC., SBA, ONE YEAR OF EQUITY
CROWDFUNDING: INITIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS 1–2, 9 (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/28180000/Crowdfun
ding_Issue_Brief_2018.pdf (analyzing SEC crowdfunding filing data in the first year of
Regulation CF).
241. Id. at 9 (stating that the average investment raised was $289,000, the median
amount raised was $170,000, the highest amount raised was $1,070,000, and the lowest
amount raised was $11,800).
242. The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, WEFUNDER, https://we
funder.com/stats (last visited May 1, 2020). Other sources report different figures. For
example, commentators analyzing data from Crowdfund Capital Advisors reported 186
consumer transactions from May through December 2016. Zachary J. Robins & Timothy
M. Joyce, How to Crowdfund and Not Fall Flat on Your Face: Best Practices for
Investment Crowdfunding and the Data to Prove It, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV.
1059, 1073 (2017).
243. Robins & Joyce, supra note 242, at 1076–77.
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among commentators that crowdfunding transactions are inherently risky
and that these risks cannot be totally eliminated.244 They also agree that
crowdfunding transactions bear a substantial and disproportionate risk of
fraud and abuse.245 The general question these scholars pose is whether a
crowdfunding regulatory regime can be crafted where the benefits to issuers
and investors outweigh these inherent risks.246 More specifically, the
question that these commentators are considering is whether the consumer
crowdfunding regime created by the JOBS Act and Regulation CF
reasonably regulates and facilitates the raising of capital by startup
entrepreneurs and minimizes the risks to investors.247 The response is that
they do not. Two general criticisms elicit a negative response to this
question. The first is that the statutory and regulatory provisions meant to
protect investors from fraud are not very effective.248 The second is that the
costs and burdens imposed on issuers and platforms by the statute and
regulation do not facilitate these transactions.249
iii. The Risk of Loss and Fraud
Proponents of consumer crowdfunding have argued that Regulation CF
provides investors with adequate protection from the risks of loss and fraud
in several ways. First, investor vetting and education provided by the
crowdfunding platforms ensures that potential investors who buy
244. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 153 (asserting that although a crowdfunding
exemption could be structured to provide investor protection, many crowdfunding
investors would still lose money as the risks associated with crowdfunding cannot be
completely eliminated); Garry A. Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All Regulated but Not
Equal, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 359, 369 (2015) (discussing the unique fraud risks
presented by crowdfunding); Dylan J. Hans, Rules Are Meant to be Amended: How
Regulation Crowdfunding’s Final Rules Impact the Lives of Startups and Small
Businesses, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1089, 1101 (2018); Arthur McMahon, It Takes a Village
to Fund a Startup: How an Electronic Community for Early-Stage Investments Can
Bring Democracy Back to Equity Crowdfunding, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1269, 1275–76
(2016).
245. See, e.g., Melissa S. Baucus & Cheryl R. Mitteness, Crowdfrauding: Avoiding
Ponzi Entrepreneurs When Investing in New Ventures, 59 BUS. HORIZONS 37, 37, 39
(2017); Bradford, supra note 153, at 105; Gabison, supra note 244, at 369; McMahon,
supra note 244, at 1282.
246. See Bradford, supra note 153, at 115–16. See generally McMahon, supra note
244, at 1277 (asking what kind of crowdfunding regime is feasible for small issuers and
whether the level of risk such a regime would present to investors was acceptable).
247. See Hans, supra note 244, at 1092.
248. See Sherief Morsy, The JOBS Act and Crowdfunding: How Narrowing the
Secondary Market Handicaps Fraud Plaintiffs, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1373, 1374, 1380–82
(2014).
249. See McMahon, supra note 244, at 1310.
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crowdfunded securities understand the nature and risks of the investments
that they are about to make, allowing them to make informed decisions.
Second, the communication channels established by the platform for the use
of potential investors and issuers unleashes the “wisdom of the crowd”:
investors will use this mechanism to identify fraudulent or risky transactions
and educate each other about investment risks and benefits. Last, platform
vetting and disclosure of issuer and transaction information will ensure that
potential investors have sufficient trustworthy information to make informed
investment decisions. Most scholars who have written about the Regulation
CF experience seem to think otherwise.250
a. Investor Vetting and Education
Investors interested in equity crowdfunding investments have been
described as unsophisticated investors from different economic classes who
have very different investment motivations.251 Unfortunately, a significant
portion of the American public seems to lack the basic financial knowledge
required to understand investment risks.252
Even expert investors
acknowledge that they often make poor decisions when evaluating proposed
startups whose issuers provide them with far more information than is
generally provided in consumer crowdfunding transactions.253
Unfortunately, the statute and the regulation do not really provide any
guidance to platforms on how potential investors should be vetted or
educated,254 and this falls outside of the core functions and expertise of most
platforms.255 As a result, it appears that the “educational” portions of U.S.
consumer crowdfunding sites are somewhat limited.256 For example,
Wefunder, one of the most active U.S. consumer crowdfunding sites,257
250. But see Robins & Joyce, supra note 242, at 1074 (stating that 2016 investment
statistics show that “the wisdom of the crowd” rejected 58 percent of the 2016
crowdfunding offerings, and claiming that “[t]he crowd, in its infinite wisdom, is
deciding who is worthy of capital”).
251. Baucus & Mitteness, supra note 245, at 42.
252. Bradford, supra note 153, at 110–12 (discussing a 2005 study in which only 17
percent of adults scored an “A” on a twenty-four-question financial literacy quiz).
253. See Baucus & Mitteness, supra note 245, at 47.
254. See McMahon, supra note 244, at 1321.
255. See Baucus & Mitteness, supra note 245, at 39, 45; Bradford, supra note 153, at
42–43 (stating that government entities are not equipped to guard against investor fraud).
256. See Baucus & Mitteness, supra note 245, at 43.
257. Joseph Hogue, Ultimate List of Crowdfunding and Fundraising Websites
[Updated 2019], CROWD 101 (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.crowd101.com/list-crowd
funding-and-fundraising-websites/.
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discloses risk information through a “Frequently Asked Questions” page
with an e-mail address for additional questions.258 It does not appear that a
potential investor has to read this disclosure prior to investing.259 Therefore,
the likelihood that consumer crowdfunding platforms are providing investor
vetting and education sufficient to make the average non-sophisticated
investor understand the risks and complexities of crowdfunded investments,
as these commentators conclude, is not great.
b. “The Wisdom of the Crowd”
The “crowd,” as described by the JOBS Act and Regulation CF critics, is
not very wise.260 It is a heterogeneous group of unsophisticated investors
whose investment motivations vary greatly.261 They are bound to act
emotionally and are subject to the tendency to follow the advice of someone
deemed to be an expert or an authority figure. Another weakness of the
crowd is that, because of its lack of sophistication, it does not generally know
the right questions to ask in order to ascertain risks or uncover fraud.262 Even
if the crowd were able to act rationally, the communication channels
mandated by the statute and the regulation are not as effective as they could
be, as they are only open to investors registered with the platform and closed
to outside individuals who might have dealt with the company and might
have relevant information to share.263 Moreover, the communication channel
among investors is closed once the transaction is completed, eliminating the
investor’s ability to communicate post offering.264
c. Due Diligence
The statute and the regulation place substantial due diligence
responsibilities, burdens, and potential liabilities on the platform, which
include investor education and screening of issuers and the documentation
that they post on the website.265 Unfortunately, the regulations neither
258. Risks, WEFUNDER, https://help.wefunder.com/#/risks (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
259. See id. (showing information about investment risks and other issues).
260. See Baucus & Mitteness, supra note 245, at 42 (explaining that the “crowd” is

made up of a large amount of unsophisticated investors).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 42; supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
263. Bradford, supra note 153, at 134–35 (arguing that communication amongst
investors should be facilitated by crowdfunding websites because, currently,
communication between investors is difficult and can make it easier to miss flaws in the
business model).
264. See id.
265. See McMahon, supra note 244, at 1318–19; see infra Part IV.B and
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require nor empower the intermediary to have the necessary tools to do the
job.266 Moreover, due diligence is costly and time-consuming, and the
platforms’ compensation for the largest crowdfunding transactions, which
typically average between $50,000 and $70,000, will not be sufficient to
underwrite the due diligence and other costs.267 “All of this results in a
situation where the extent of due diligence by the platforms themselves will
vary widely, which creates opportunities for fraudulent ventures to use
them.”268 Due diligence will vary depending on the number of personnel,
procedural templates used, and time spent. This discrepancy creates
opportunities for fraudulent ventures to use sites which are known for light
vetting.
d. Remedies for Fraud or Misrepresentation.
As we have seen, the JOBS Act contains a provision that subjects issuers
to liability for losses resulting from material misrepresentations and
omissions in connection with a crowdfunding transaction.269 This remedy,
which gives investors the right to file an action to recover their losses, may
be difficult to enforce.270 Since the amount of crowdfunding investments is
capped by the statute, a scholar notes, each investor’s loss will be relatively
small and the costs of litigation will generally exceed any possible recovery,
making an individual action for damages unfeasible.271 Moreover, the
maximum amount allowed in a crowdfunding transaction is so low that it
renders the possibility of class action litigation against the issuer unlikely to
succeed.272 Because of the small amounts involved and limited government
entity enforcement funding, crowdfunding fraud cases are unlikely to be a
high enforcement priority.273 Lastly, even if the investors were to
successfully sue the issuer, given most startups’ limited amounts of cash, it
is doubtful that a defrauded investor would be able to enforce a judgment.
accompanying text.
266. See McMahon, supra note 244, at 1321.
267. McMahon, supra note 244, at 1322.
268. Baucus & Mitteness, supra note 245, at 45.
269. See 17 C.F.R § 227.402 (2019).
270. Steven Bradford, Online Arbitration as a Remedy for Crowdfunding Fraud, 45
FLA. ST. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2018).
271. Id.
272. See id. at 1169 (arguing for the establishment of an arbitration remedy as an
appropriate remedy for the resolution of crowdfunding fraud cases).
273. See id. at 1182–83 (arguing that, if crowdfunding transactions become popular,
the SEC would not have sufficient resources to keep up with demand for enforcement
action against fraudsters).
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iv. Burdens and Costs.
Another criticism of the U.S. consumer crowdfunding regime is that it
imposes burdens and costs on issuers and intermediaries that make it
prohibitively expensive and impractical.274 For the intermediaries, these
costs include SEC and Financial Industry Regulation Authority (“FINRA”)
registration and compliance costs, as well as the costs involved in fulfilling
the issuer vetting and investor education requirements set forth in statutes
and regulations,275 costs which exceed the $50,000–$70,000 in compensation
the intermediaries receive for their services.276 For issuers, these costs
include intermediary fees, preparation and compliance costs for the offering
statement, costs of accounting review or audit of financial statements, and
the cost of ongoing SEC reporting.277 These costs, estimated by the SEC at
between $72,800 and $168,500 for a one million dollar offering
(approximately ten percent of funds sought) are substantial for a startup
company and constitute a significant deterrent to issuers.278 For this reason,
the suggestion has been made that the statute be amended to increase the
maximum amount of consumer crowdfunding offerings from the current
$1.07 million to $5 million per twelve-month period. In May of 2017, a bill
was introduced in the Senate279 that would allow “crowdfunding vehicles”280
to invest an unlimited amount in crowdfunded transactions. This bill had not
become law at the time of publication. On March 4, 2020, however, the SEC,
as part of a major restructuring of regulations dealing with exempt
transactions, proposed an amendment to Regulation CF that would increase
the maximum amount of consumer crowdfunding offerings to five million
dollars per twelve-month period.281 This proposal would also amend the
274. McMahon, supra note 244, at 1310; Hans, supra note 244, at 1106–07.
275. See Hans, supra note 244, at 1094–95.
276. See id. at 1104 (stating that in addition to the costs involved in a crowdfunding

transaction, issuers are also subject to significant publicity and advertising restrictions
during the offering process).
277. See id. at 1104–05 (discussing the costs that correspond with issuer
requirements); see also McMahon, supra note 244, at 1312–16 (providing examples of
the several financial burdens on issuers).
278. Hans, supra note 244, at 1104–05 (noting that the deterrent effect stems from the
issuing costs making smaller offerings less expensive).
279. Crowdfunding Enhancement Act, S. 1031, 115th Cong. (2017).
280. Id. § 2(b) (defining a crowdfunding vehicle as a company whose purpose is
limited to acquiring, holding, and disposing of securities issued by a single company in
one or more transactions made pursuant to § 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
which meets a series of noted conditions).
281. 2020 Proposed Regulatory Amendments, supra note 180, at § 227.100 (a)(1), p.
289.
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regulations under the Investment Company Act of 1940 to allow the creation
of crowdfunding vehicles.282
The statute and the regulation further constrain investors in consumer
crowdfunding in two ways. First, the regulation’s split limit on individual
investments in crowdfunded issues constrains the efficiency of capital
formation and prevents investors from diversifying their investments in
crowdfunded securities.283 Solutions to this problem range from changing
the investment cap in crowdfunded securities to maximum investments per
issuer284 to amending the statute and regulation from a “lesser of both
metrics” system to a “greater of both metrics” standard, similar to that of
Regulation D.285
Second, U.S. crowdfunding norms limit the sale of, and do not permit a
secondary market for crowdfunded securities.286 These restrictions make
investments in crowdfunded securities less attractive because their lack of
liquidity prevents the investor from having access to her funds by selling her
security.287 Furthermore, the investor’s inability to resell crowdfunded
securities prevents the investor from realizing a gain or minimizing a loss in
the value of her investment.
The answer to the question of how well the JOBS Act and Regulation CF
resolve, or at lease balance, the crowdfunding conundrum is mixed. Issuers
might argue that Regulation CF crowdfunding is not an attractive proposition
because of the limitation on the amount of funds that are crowdfunded,
282. Id. § 270.31-9, p. 329.
283. See Hans, supra note 244, at 1102–03 (explaining that the regulation means that

an investor who meets the accredited investor status under Regulation D, which uses the
higher of both metrics to test for eligibility, would be able to purchase an unlimited
amount of securities in a private placement, but no more than $107,000 in a crowdfunded
issue); McMahon, supra note 244, at 1311–12 (providing a numeric example of a
consequence created by the split limit); see also Robins & Joyce, supra note 242, at 1070
(noting that the limitation on yearly investments by a given investor is new to securities).
284. McMahon, supra note 244, at 1332 (providing that Regulation AGORA would
set the maximum investment per issuer at $500 per year).
285. Hans, supra note 244, at 1110.
286. See Louise Lee, The Missing Piece that Could Hold Back Equity Crowdfunding,
WALL ST. J. (May 1, 2016, 10:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-missing-piecethat-could-hold-back-equity-crowdfunding-1462155373 (arguing that the lack of a
secondary market deters buyers); see also supra note 207 and accompanying text (noting
that under the statute and regulations, purchasers of crowdfunded securities may not
resell their investments for at least a year after purchase and there is no provision in the
statute or regulations for a secondary market for crowdfunded securities); infra Part V
(discussing crowdfunding in the Spanish legal system).
287. SEC, REPORT ON REGULATION CROWDFUNDING (2019) [hereinafter REPORT ON
REGULATION CROWDFUNDING].
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coupled with its high costs, substantial regulatory requirements, and
potential for liability.288 The response to this argument is simple. Because
of the risky nature of startup investments and the lack of investor
sophistication, the regulatory requirements imposed on the issuer are
reasonable and appropriate. Cost is likely the principal issue for issuers.
Raising the maximum amount that can be crowdfunded from one million to
two million dollars, as is the case in Spain,289 is a reasonable accommodation
that would increase the issuer’s ability to raise capital and would lower their
costs. However, increasing the maximum amount to five million dollars is
not a good idea, given the unsophisticated nature of offerees in consumer
crowdfunding offerings.
The treatment of consumer crowdfunding intermediaries in the JOBS Act
and Regulation CF is problematic. Intermediaries are not required to have
minimum capital, insurance, or experience and expertise, which can result in
the registration of less than adequate firms as platforms.290 The vetting of
investors, issuers, and their principals imposes substantial compliance
obligations, and is essentially outsourced to intermediaries without
indicating how it must be done, and what and how much vetting by the
intermediary will protect the investor from liability.291
Given this lack of regulatory clarity and the intermediary’s low profit
margin on the crowdfunded issues, these firms will, as a matter of economic
necessity, engage in the least (and cheapest) amount of vetting possible. This
approach greatly increases the risk of fraud liability. Since intermediaries
are not required to have minimum capitalization or insurance and are not
likely to be large firms, it is likely that an intermediary’s liability for its
involvement in a fraudulent transaction will bankrupt the firm. The SEC
should consider imposing minimum capitalization and insurance
requirements as additional protection for investors. Moreover, regulatory
clarity should be imposed by amending Regulation CF to clarify how the
required vetting of investors and transactions must be undertaken. This
clarification must balance the interest of sufficient protection with the cost
and effectiveness of the requirements to be imposed.

288. See id. at 23–26 (discussing the types of costs incurred by issuers).
289. Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 68 (B.O.E. 2015, 4607) (Spain).
290. See REPORT ON REGULATION CROWDFUNDING, supra note 287, at 27 (noting that

there are 45 funding platforms registered with FINRA yet the 3 largest platforms
completed the majority of offerings, and that smaller platforms may have to exit the
market if they fail to attract a sufficient flow of deals).
291. See id. at 29 (discussing intermediaries’ gatekeeper function regarding issuer
compliance).
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The protection of investors in Regulation CF is inadequate.292 Its sliding
investment limits (which currently permit investments of up to $107,000)
and its prohibition on diversification may cause unsophisticated investors to
suffer a massive loss on extremely risky investments and prevent them from
minimizing their risks and losses.293 The SEC should consider adoption of
the Spanish regulatory system. It creates a set (and relatively low)
investment cap for all unsophisticated investors and allows for the
diversification and resale of crowdfunded investments, which offers better
protection for investors. 294
As the Article discusses above, the investment cap on consumer
crowdfunded investments for accredited investors does not make sense and
does not exist in the context of accredited investor crowdfunding.
Accredited investors, as is the case in Spain, should be allowed to invest the
same amount in both types of crowdfunding. In fact, the SEC’s proposed
amendments to Regulation CF offer just that.295 As currently practiced,
crowdfunding investor education is highly inadequate. As articulated above,
educational materials are placed in a Frequently Asked Question section on
the website, and the only action potential investors have to take in order to
invest is “point and click” to affirm that they have read and understood these
materials.296 Given most consumers’ experience with e-commerce, it is
highly unlikely that most participants will have done so. Requiring a
potential investor to interact with the educational materials or engage in a
computer simulation of the potential results of her investment represents a
preferable approach, because it increases the probability that a potential
investor has read and understood the educational materials provided.
Lastly, the limitation of the online communication channels to registered
potential investors only imposes a limit on the amount and nature of the
information exchanged among potential investors and therefore creates a risk
that the “wisdom of the crowd” will be adversely affected by the lack of
potentially important information.297 The SEC should consider opening a
292. See generally id. (providing background information regarding the impact of
Regulation CF on investor protection, including a discussion on requirements, direct
feedback from intermediaries, potential investor protections, and special purpose vehicle
structures).
293. See id. at 6–7 (noting that investment limits depend on investors’ net worth).
294. See infra note 390 (explaining the yearly cap for U.S. investors).
295. 2020 Proposed Regulatory Amendments, supra note 180, at §227.100 (a)(2),
p.289.
296. See WEFUNDER, supra note 258 (providing an example of an FAQ section
containing educational materials).
297. See Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers,
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portion of this communication to non-registered potential investors who
might have highly relevant information to share. Since the intermediary
provides the infrastructure and monitors this channel, it can take steps to
prevent non-registered potential investors from abusing the channel.
V. CROWDFUNDING IN THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM
A. The Regulation of the Securities Industry in Spanish Law
The securities industry in Spain is primarily regulated by the Ley del
Mercado de Valores (“LMV”), which was originally enacted in 1988.298
Another statute, Real Decreto 13/10/2005, supplements the LMV’s
provisions regarding public and private offerings.299 A third statute, the Ley
de Sociedades de Capital, (“LSC”) also has provisions that are applicable to
the securities market.300
The LMV is meant to regulate all Spanish entities involved in the
negotiation, sale, and registration of “financial instruments.”301 The term
“financial instruments” is broadly and extensively defined and is meant to
cover a wide range of negotiable securities.302
The LMV establishes the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores
(“CNMV”) as the principal regulator of the securities industry.303 Its
members are appointed by the executive branch of the government from
individuals with recognized competence and experience in matters involving
the securities markets. 304
The CNMV is also charged with advising the executive and legislative
branches of the government on issues related to the securities markets.305
SEC (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide051316.htm (outlining the limitations of channel communication).
298. Stock Market Law (B.O.E. 2015, 255) (Spain) (noting the original adaptation of
this law as Ley 24, 2988 de 28 de Julio, BOE-A-1988-18764 with a number of
amendments, the last being on December 20, 3017).
299. Secondary Market for Negotiation of Stocks Law (B.O.E. 2015, 274) (Spain).
300. Capital Companies Law (B.O.E. 2010, 10544) (Spain) [hereinafter LSC] (noting
the original adaptation of the Ley the Sociedades de Capital as Law 3/2009, BOE-A2009-5614 on April 3, 2009, with multiple amendments and reorganizations after).
301. Stock Market Law art. 1.
302. See id. arts. 2, 7 (“The LMV provides that all negotiable securities that are
publicly traded must exist only in book entry.”).
303. See id. art. 198 (establishing the role of the CNMV).
304. See id. arts. 23–32 (describing appointees and the internal organization ad
operations of the CNMV).
305. See id. art. 17 (“Its broad jurisdiction includes the supervision, regulation and
inspection of securities markets and all participants therein; oversight over the
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The CNMV has the power to issue interpretative regulations and technical
guides explaining its interpretation of the law and regulations306 and has
extensive powers to supervise, inspect, and sanction all principal actors
involved in the securities markets.307
The LMV also imposes an extensive number of obligations and duties for
securities professionals towards their clients. These professionals have a
general duty of due diligence and transparency to their clients, and are
required to provide them with clear, impartial, and accurate information
related to their investments.308 They must know their customers, evaluate
their investment knowledge, experience, financial condition and investment
objectives, and provide them with appropriate information and warnings
about their potential investments and investment strategies.309 The LMV
further prohibits market manipulation and insider trading.310
Issuers seeking to sell securities in a public offering must prove to the
CNMV that the securities they wish to sell are suitable for sale to the public.
Issuers must obtain the CNMV’s approval prior to commencing sales.311 In
order to prove its suitability for entry into the market, the issuer must file
certain corporate documents accrediting its compliance with all applicable
legislation, as well as two or three years of audited annual financial
statements.312 It must also establish that the securities intended to be sold
meet certain requirements313 and must submit to the CNMV a document
containing all information relating to the issuer, the securities, and the
transaction that investors need in order to properly evaluate the proposed
investment.314 The CNMV then has ten business days to approve the
document. Once it is approved, the document will be registered and the
transparency of the markets; the protection of investors; and the promotion of the free
flow of information to the markets.”).
306. See id. art. 21 (explaining the scope of powers).
307. See id. arts. 233–313 (describing the CNMV powers in detail).
308. See id. arts. 209–10 (identifying the duties of the professionals).
309. See id. arts. 210, 212–13 (describing the scope of duties to the clients).
310. See id. arts. 225–32 (explaining the permissible actions under the LMV).
311. See id. arts. 33–40, 205 (identifying limited exceptions to this requirement and
defining accredited investors).
312. See Secondary Market of Negotiation of Stocks Law arts. 11–12 (B.O.E. 2015,
274) (Spain) (disclosing an issuer’s requirements for proving suitability).
313. See id. art. 9 (“These requirements include, inter alia, that the securities are
validly issued, that they are sold in book entry form, and that the minimum value of the
securities being sold is three million euros for equity securities and 200,000 Euros for
debt securities.”).
314. See id. arts. 16–23 (defining document structure and detailing requirements for
organization and structure).
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issuer may legally use it.315 Transactions involving certain types of
securities, such as those offered to employees, are exempt from the
information document and above requirements,316 and certain transactions
are not considered public offerings.317 The CNMV has broad regulatory
powers to require the issuer to provide additional information, or the CNMV
can prohibit or suspend an offering.318
As is the case in the United States, the LMV also requires domestic and
foreign issuers of securities traded in Spain to file periodic reports with the
CNMV.319 Securities that have been previously issued may be sold in a
secondary market, such as a security exchange, as long as several conditions
are met.320 First, the issuer must file with the CNMV copies of its constituent
documents and financial statements prepared and audited in accordance with
applicable legislation.321 The issuer must also prepare and file with the
CNMV an information statement relating to the securities to be sold.322
Second, the issuer must comply with all listing requirements and conditions
set forth by the secondary market in which the securities are to be traded.323
Last, the issuer must comply with all regulations that may be issued with the
CNMV, which cover the market, industry, issuer, or type of security.324
Issuers whose securities are traded in secondary markets are required to file

315. See id. arts. 24–26 (contending that the issuer may legally use documents
pending registration).
316. See id. at art. 26 (defining exemptions to document requirements).
317. See id. arts. 38–40 (stating that “[t]hese include, inter alia, offers made
exclusively to accredited investors, offers made to less than 100 offerees, and offers for
less than 2,500,00 Euros a year” and defining an accredited investor).
318. See id. art. 44 (identifying regulatory powers of the CNMV).
319. See, e.g., Stock Market Law arts. 118–21 (B.O.E. 2015, 255) (Spain) (describing
some limited exceptions to this requirement); see also Secondary Market of Negotiation
of Stocks Law art. 5. I (identifying requirements for domestic and foreign issuers).
320. See Stock Market Law art. 43 (establishing that secondary markets are defined
and listed).
321. See id. arts. 36(a)–(b) (listing duties of the issuer).
322. See id. arts. 36(c), 37(1), 37(3)–(4) (“The information statement must contain
enough information to permit potential investors to make an evaluation of the issues, its
business and the securities being sold. At a minimum, the statement must include, inter
alia, a concise summary, drafted in non-technical language, of the information that
investors need to determine whether to invest, a brief description of the issuer’s assets,
liabilities, and financial condition, as well as a description of the general conditions and
terms of the offer and of the risks associated with investment.”).
323. See id. art. 36 (describing the requirements for admission to securities
negotiations in the secondary market).
324. See id. arts. 76(1)–(2) (listing duties of issuers).
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quarterly and annual financial reports.325
The second important securities regulation statute in Spain is the LSC, a
statute that was meant to codify and harmonize separate legislation
regulating different types of business entities.326 It applies to Sociadades
Anónimas (corporations), Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada (limited
liability companies), and Sociedades Comanditarias por Acciones (limited
partnerships).327 It also creates, as a subset of the limited liability company,
an entity known as “Sociedad Nueva Empresa” (startup company), an entity
with minimum capitalization and vastly simplified operating norms.328
Under the LSC, only corporations may sell their securities in a public
offering.329 They may do so as part of their organizational process or
thereafter.330 The LSC also exempts publicly traded corporations from
certain operational requirements and creates numerous other rules that apply
only to these entities.331 None of these statutes authorize the use of
crowdfunding for investment purposes.332 As was the case in the United
States before the JOBS Act, none of these statutes authorize the use of
crowdfunding for investment purposes.
B. Ley 5/2015
In April of 2015, Spain enacted Ley 5/2015, which was intended to present
a package of regulatory provisions meant to stimulate alternate financing for
businesses, especially small- and medium-sized ones.333 Title V of this law
specifically created a legal framework that authorized and regulated

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. arts. 118–19.
Capital Companies Law art. 1 (B.O.E. 2010, 161) (Spain).
See id. art. 1.
See id. arts. 443–54.
Main Characteristics of Corporations and Limited Liability Companies, GUIDE
TO BUSINESS IN SPAIN, https://guidetobusinessinspain.com/en/anex1-legislacion-enmateria-de-sociedades/anex1-4-principales-caracteristicas-de-las-s-a-y-s-l/ (last visited
May 1, 2020).
330. Capital Companies Law arts. 41–47 (explaining that a corporation wishing to
make a public offering as part of its organizational process must submit a business plan,
a technical report attesting to the viability of the business plan, and other documentation).
331. See id. arts. 495, 523 (exempting the corporation temporarily from public
disclosure requirements).
332. Law of Promoting Business Financing preamble II–III (B.O.E. 2015, 101)
(Spain).
333. See id. at preamble I (explaining that the government has launched a strategic
twist of regulations to make financing more available and developing alternative means
of financing).
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crowdfunding.334 This statute is Spain’s attempt to resolve the crowdfunding
conundrum.
Ley 5/2015 starts this framework by specifically authorizing the creation
of Internet platforms (“Plataformas de Financiación Participativa” or
“PFP’s”) to serve as electronic intermediaries between individuals or entities
that solicit financing for a crowdfunding project (“issuers”) from individuals
or entities that wish to invest (“investors”).335 The statute specifically defines
a crowdfunding project as one where an issuer solicits financing for an
entrepreneurial project on its own behalf from investors who are seeking a
monetary profit.336 Crowdfunding projects may involve the sale, without a
prospectus, of securities or a request for a loan.337
Unlike the JOBS Act and Regulation CF in the United States, which Ley
5/2015 resembles, Ley 5/2015 does not have a separate regulatory template
or process for accredited investor crowdfunding.338 It does, however,
provide for the investment in crowdfunded transactions by accredited
investors, under looser requirements and without investor limits.339
i. Provisions relating to intermediaries (Platforms)
Platforms under Ley 5/2015 receive, select, and publish proposals for
crowdfunding projects; they further develop, establish, and operate
communications channels that facilitate investments in these projects.340
They are permitted, but not required, to provide additional services341 but are
334. See id. art. 46.
335. See id. arts. 46–47 (explaining that intermediaries who serve as intermediaries in

crowdfunding transactions involving donations, the sale of goods and services, and
interest free loans are specifically excluded from coverage, as well as crowdfunding
transactions involving Spanish residents using foreign Internet platforms).
336. See id. art. 49 (elucidating that the project may not involve investments or loans
to third parties, the purchase of publicly traded securities or investments in firms
dedicated to investment).
337. See id. art. 50 (explaining that unlike the LSC, Ley 5/2015 allows limited liability
companies to sell their securities to the public in a crowdfunding transaction).
338. See McMahon, supra note 244, at 1316–18.
339. See, e.g., Law of Promoting Business Financing arts. 67–68.
340. Id. art. 51.
341. See id. (confirming that these additional services include giving advice to issuers
regarding the publication of the project on the platform, especially information
technology and design; analyzing submitted crowdfunding projects, as well as engaging
in risk analysis or other research relating to these projects; providing model
documentation; transmitting information received about the issuers and the project;
developing communication channels that permit issuers and investors to communicate
directly with each other about the project; as well as representing investors with judicial
or nonjudicial claims).
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forbidden from engaging in practices reserved for investment firms or
banking or financing entities.342
In order to engage in crowdfunding projects, all platforms must apply for
registration with the CNMV and, once approved, will appear in a public
registry.343 Registered platforms must file periodic reports with the
CNMV.344 If a registered platform fails to conduct or interrupt its operations
for more than twelve months, its registration may be suspended.345
Entities seeking registration as PFPs must meet certain non-financial and
financial prerequisites. Unlike the JOBS Act and Regulation CF,346 Ley
5/2015 requires that candidates show that their administrators are
“honorable”347 and possess adequate and appropriate knowledge and
experience that will enable them to adequately perform their duties. The
applicant must also show that it has good administrative, accounting, and
internal control organization and procedures, as well as adequate
mechanisms that guarantee the security, confidentiality, and reliability of its
electronic systems.348 Moreover, the applicant must have an adequate
internal mechanism to deal with conflicts of interest and the appropriate
conduct of all employees in dealing with proposed crowdfunding projects.349
Financially, the statute requires that platforms have, at all times, a minimum
capitalization of €60,000, as well as professional liability insurance with a
minimum coverage of €300,000–€400,000.350
Once an application is filed with the CNMV, it must be approved or denied
within three months after receipt or, if further documentation is required, no
342. See id. (acknowledging that these entities are subject to substantial regulation
elsewhere).
343. See id. arts. 47, 53–54; Platformas de Financión Participativa, COMISIÓN
NACIONAL DEL MERCADO DE VALORES, http://www.cnmv.es/platform/Consultas/
Plataforma/Financiacion-Participativa-Listado.aspx (last visited May 1, 2020).
344. Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 91.
345. Id. art. 59.
346. See McMahon, supra note 244, at 1331–32 (recommending a new SEC program
which would include biographies of officers and company holders to reveal any “bad
actors”).
347. See Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 55(e) (explaining that
“honorability” is defined through an author’s translation in the statute as “having shown
personal, commercial and professional conduct that do not raise concerns about their
capacity to engage in a prudent and honest management of the enterprise”).
348. Id. arts. 55(f)–(g).
349. Id. art. 55(h).
350. Id. arts. 56(1)(a)–(c) (stating that the minimum capitalization requirements
progressively increase once the platform has raised more than two million euros in a
calendar year).
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more than six months from receipt.351 If the CNMV has not acted within this
time period, the application will be deemed denied.352 The CNMV has
substantial supervisory and regulatory power over registered platforms and
has the power to impose penalties on them for a number of offenses.353
Ley 5/2015 also imposes a code of conduct for registered platforms.354
Under this code of conduct, platforms must conduct their operations in a
neutral, diligent, and transparent fashion, and have a duty to serve the best
interest of their clients.355 As is the case in the United States,356 websites
must warn potential investors, inter alia, about the risks surrounding
crowdfunded investments, including the risk of investment loss, illiquidity,
and dilution.357 They must also clearly disclose their operational procedures,
fees, conflict of interest policies, antifraud policies, the identity of their
auditors, and their mechanisms for investigating and resolving investor
complaints.358
Under the conflict of interest policy, platforms must disclose all potential
conflicts and protect confidential information entrusted to them. Moreover,
they are barred from giving investors any personalized advice regarding any
potential investments offered in the platform.359 Platforms may not purchase
more than ten percent of the amount being sought for any investment they
own or by any issuer advertising in the site or of the amount being sought
and must clearly disclose this investment.360
ii. Provisions relating to sellers of securities
Issuers must be registered in either Spain or another EU member state, and
neither they nor any of their principals may be in bankruptcy, reorganization,
or previously convicted of any crimes involving fraud, embezzlement, tax
evasion, or money laundering.361
Crowdfunding projects may not raise funds in more than one platform and
351. Id. art. 53.
352. See id. arts. 53, 57–58 (describing the documentation required for the

application).
353. Id. arts. 89–93.
354. Id. arts. 60–64.
355. Id.
356. See supra Part IV.
357. Law of Promoting Business Financing arts. 61(b)–(d).
358. Id. arts. 61(e)–(n); see infra Part IV.
359. Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 62(b); see Hurt, supra note 14, at 244.
360. Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 63(1).
361. Id. art. 67.
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may not raise more than a total of two million euros ($2,248,000).362
Platforms are required to ensure that each project has a financing target and
a schedule for reaching it. Should the financing target not be achieved as
scheduled, all invested funds must be returned.363
Any issuer seeking to raise capital is required to provide the platform with
sufficient information, presented in non-technical language, about itself and
the projects for which funding is being sought to enable a reasonable investor
to make an informed decision regarding the investment.364 Although the
issuer is responsible for the completeness and accuracy of the information
furnished to the platform,365 the platform is responsible for conducting a due
diligence review of both the issuer’s qualifications for listing as well as the
completeness and accuracy of the information provided by the issuer.366
Any issuer who participates in a crowdfunding transaction must amend its
constituent documents to recognize shareholder’s rights to participate in
shareholder meetings through electronic means, grant shareholders the right
to vote by proxy, and require the disclosure to all shareholders of any
shareholder agreements that may affect the right to vote or transfer
ownership of its securities. Any contrary provisions set forth in the issuer’s
constituent documents are null and void.367 Any securities issued in a
crowdfunding transaction are subject to regulation under the appropriate
sections of the LMV and the LSC. 368
iii. Provisions relating to investors in securities
Provisions of Ley 5/2015 that relate to investors are set forth under the
heading of “Investor Protection.”369 They include provisions on investor
qualification, investing limits for crowdfunding transactions, information

362. Id. art. 68 (stating that crowdfunding projects directed exclusively at accredited
investors may raise up to five million euros).
363. Id. art. 69 (highlighting that there are also exceptions to this rule).
364. Id. arts. 70, 78–89 (stating that certain specific information about the issuer and
the offer be included).
365. Id. art. 73.
366. Id. arts. 66, 71–72 (stating that the platform is also responsible for the publication
of this information in its website and for ensuring that the information transmitted
between the issuer and any investors through its communication channels is easily
accessible to any other potential investors, and that the platform must retain any
information transmitted through this channel for at least five years).
367. Id. art. 80.
368. Id. art. 77.
369. Id. arts. 81–88.
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requirements, and other legal protections.370
Investors in crowdfunding transactions, as they are in the JOBS Act,371 are
first categorized as either accredited or unaccredited investors. Accredited
investors are individuals with assets of over €100,000 or a yearly income of
over €50,000.372 Accredited investors must specifically request this status
from the platform,373 which must then determine that the investor has
sufficient investment knowledge, skills, and experience to make informed
investment decisions and understand the risks of investing in crowdfunding
transactions.374 All other investors in crowdfunding transactions are
considered unaccredited investors. Accredited investors are not subject to
any investment limits.375
Unaccredited investors may not invest more than €3,000 ($3,412) in an
individual crowdfunding transaction and may not invest more than €10,000
($11,376) a year in transactions listed on a single platform.376 Prior to
accepting an investment from an unaccredited investor, the platform must
obtain a specific representation from the investor that he has been warned of
the risks of investing in a crowdfunding project and that he has not invested
more than €10,000 ($11,376) in other crowdfunding projects during the
previous year.377
Unlike the JOBS Act and Regulation CF, Ley 5/2015 does not have an
express prohibition against the resale of crowdfunded securities.378 Indeed,
it seems to suggest that these securities may be resold.379 Further,
unaccredited investors, certain issuers and platforms are subject to certain
consumer protection norms. 380

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

McMahon, supra note 244, at 1294.
Id.
Id.
Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 81(1).
See id. art. 81(2)(c) (explaining that individuals who may not meet the minimum
assets and income set forth in the statute may nevertheless apply for and be considered
accredited investors as long as they can establish that they are represented by an
appropriate investment advisory firm).
375. See id. art. 82 (discussing only limits to non-accredited investors).
376. Id. arts. 82(a)–(b).
377. Id. art. 82(b).
378. See id. art. 77 (discussing crowdfunding regulation but failing to mention
anything regarding the prohibition of crowdfunded securities).
379. See id. (noting that the provision states that securities sold in crowdfunded
offering are subject to the provisions of the CNMV and LSC; the former authorizes and
regulates the sale of securities in the secondary market).
380. Id. arts. 85–88.
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C. The Spanish Crowdfunding Experience
Although a recent phenomenon, equity crowdfunding in Spain is part of a
vibrant crowdfunding sector and has been the subject of academic
commentary.381
The principal issue involving the regulation of
crowdfunding, an author noted, was striking a balance between
overregulation of the crowdfunding sector, which would make it impossible
for small firms to raise capital through this mechanism, and under-regulation,
which would fail to protect investors and the market.382 This balance is
extremely hard to achieve and may involve either adapting crowdfunding to
the current system of Spanish corporate and securities law or creating new
legal norms to regulate the phenomenon.383 Other scholars, in a 2016 report
on crowdfunding in Spain, have noted challenges involving crowdfunding
activity that included fraud, an overly restrictive statute, lack of data
regarding completed crowdfunded projects, and financial sustainability
issues involving crowdfunding platforms.384 The issues resulting in fraud
noted in the report included insufficient emphasis on risk mitigation and
conflicts of interest, inadequate post-completion communication, lack of
conflict resolution mechanisms between issuers and investors, lack of
knowledge of industry best practices, and delays in the completion of
commitments.385 The report also notes that the current legislation is too
restrictive to properly incentivize the development of the crowdfunding
sector. 386
Although Ley 5/2015 creates a regulatory framework similar to that of the
JOBS Act and Regulation CF, there are some notable differences in its

381. UNIVERSO CROWDFUNDING ET AL.,
FINANCIACIÓN PARTICIPATIVA
(CROWDFUNDING) EN ESPAÑA-INFORME ANUAL 2016 4–5, 13 (2016), https://www.uni
versocrowdfunding.com/wp-content/uploads/UC_Informe-AnualCF_en-Espa%C3%B1
a-2016_def.pdf (showing that that completed equity crowdfunding transactions in Spain
during 2015 raised €6,018,944 ($6,989,707.28); in 2016, completed equity
crowdfunding transactions raised €16,078,958 ($18,352,201.87), an increase of
167.14%; in addition to equity crowdfunding transactions, completed crowdlending
transactions in Spain totaled €32,792,040; the next year, completed crowdlending
transactions totaled €61,989,491 and completed real estate crowdfunding transactions
totaled €61,689,491).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Rodriguez de las Heras, El Crowdfunding Como Mecanismo Alternativo de
Financiación de Proyectos, 1 REVISTA DE DERECHO EMPRESARIAL 121, 136–37 (2014)
(on file with author).
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approach.387 First, Ley 5/2015 imposes a number of requirements on a
platform and its operations that are not present in its U.S. counterpart.388
These include character experience and knowledge requirements for the
operator and adequate systems of internal controls, electronic systems,
security, and reliability, as well as conflict of interest and employee conduct.
Furthermore, unlike the situation in the United States, platforms are subject
to minimum capitalization and liability insurance requirements.389
Moreover, issuers in consumer crowdfunding projects in Spain are able to
raise twice as much capital as their counterparts in the United States.390 In
the Spanish system, intermediaries are responsible for the completeness and
accuracy of the disclosure set forth in the platform.391 As a result, the
Spanish investor is able to diversify her crowdfunded investment and,
consequently, is better able to minimize her potential loss then her U.S.
counterpart.
Similarly, Ley 5/2015 specifically requires issuers to ensure that investors
in crowdfunded transactions have the right to participate in shareholder
meetings through electronic means and grant them the right to vote by
proxy.392
Spanish investors in crowdfunding issues have a much lower investment
cap than their U.S. counterparts, but the cap expressly increases for
investments in more than one crowdfunded issue.393 Notably, Ley 5/2015
387. Law of Promoting Business Financing preamble & art. 55 (B.O.E. 2015, 4607)
(Spain).
388. Id. art. 55.
389. Id. art. 56.
390. See id. arts. 56, 68 (allowing issuers to raise €2,000,000 ($2,264,000) per project,
while the JOBS Act places the limit at $1,000,000 adjusted for inflation (currently
$1,115,634.55). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2018) (allowing issuers to raise a
maximum of one million dollars adjusted for inflation during a twelve-month period),
with Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 68 (allowing issuers to raise a maximum
of two million euros during a twelve-month period).
391. Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 86.
392. Id. art. 80.
393. See id. art. 56 (discussing the financial requirements in the statute — U.S.
investors under Regulation CF have a yearly cap for all issues of the greater of $2,200 or
five percent of annual income for investors with either an annual income or net worth of
less than $107,000, or ten percent of the lesser of the investor’s annual income or net
worth if the investor’s annual income and net worth exceed $107,000 — and stating that
the purpose of this cap is, presumably, to limit an unaccredited investor’s risk of loss in
a crowdfunding investment; for the drafters of the JOBS Act, the higher the investor’s
income, the more capacity she has to absorb risk; Ley 5/2015 works differently: it sets
a €3,000 ($3,396) yearly cap for a single investment; but allows investors to invest up to
€10,000 ($11,328) in multiple crowdfunded investments).
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does not prohibit the resale of securities sold in crowdfunding transactions,
allowing investors an exit opportunity not available to consumer
crowdfunding investors in the United States.394 As a result, the Spanish
investor potentially faces less liability than her U.S. counterpart. As in the
United States, accredited investors have no investment cap in crowdfunded
offerings.
The income and net worth requirements for accredited investors are
similar.395 Ley 5/2015, unlike its U.S. counterpart, allows individuals who
may not meet the minimum assets and income requirements to be considered
an accredited investor if they are represented by an appropriate investment
advisory firm.396 Finally, and most importantly, Ley 5/2015 does not
prohibit the resale of securities sold in crowdfunded transactions.397
Ley 5/2015, whose regulatory template resembles that of the JOBS Act,
has nevertheless done a better job at balancing the interests in the
crowdfunding conundrum than its U.S. counterpart. By doubling the amount
that issuers may raise while maintaining disclosure requirements similar to
those in the JOBS Act, Ley 5/2015 allows issuers more fundraising
flexibility and lower costs, while protecting investors by requiring the
disclosure of all material information related to the investment.
Intermediaries are much more regulated by Ley 5/2015 than by Regulation
CF.398 Ley 5/2015 imposes a series of experience, knowledge, capitalization,
insurance, infrastructure, and conduct requirements that ensure that
intermediaries can perform their functions well. One issue is of particular
note here: the provision that specifies that intermediaries are only
responsible for a review of the issuers’ qualifications for listing and the
accuracy and completeness of the information posted on the site provides
regulatory clarity as to the nature of their vetting obligations.399
Ley 5/2015 allows both accredited investors and consumers to make
investments in crowdfunded issues.400 For consumers, the set investment
caps and the ability to split that cap among more than one issuer limits their
394. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
395. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2019) (describing the introduction of the

Crowdfunding Enhancement Act, which permits an unlimited amount of investment in
crowdfunding transactions), with Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 81(1).
(providing that investors in crowdfunding will be lucky to obtain profit from a return).
396. Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 81(2)(d)(3).
397. Id. art. 77.
398. See id. arts. 61(e)–(h) (outlining several types of requirements that serve to
regulate source platforms and other intermediaries).
399. See supra Part IV.B.ii.–C.ii.
400. Law of Promoting Business Financing art. 81.
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risk of loss and allows for diversification. For all investors, the ability to
resell a crowdfunded investment allows them to realize their gains or
minimize their losses within a reasonable time. Notably, the Ley 5/2015
investors’ bill of rights forces issuers to provide mechanisms that give the
purchasers of crowdfunded shares the opportunity to be treated the same as
other shareholders of the same class. The inclusion of similar provisions in
Regulation CF is also worthy of consideration.
VI. ENTER THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE PROPOSED EU CROWDFUNDING
REGULATION
In March of 2018, the European Commission proposed a Regulation on
European crowdfunding service providers to the European Council and
Parliament.401 Its purpose is to facilitate the expansion of crowdfunding
services throughout the European market by supplementing the varying
crowdfunding legislative frameworks currently in existence.402 The
Commission views crowdfunding as an important source of non-bank
financing, especially for small and medium enterprises, that can further a
system of more sustainable financial integration and private investments and
promote job creation and economic growth.403 The proposed Regulation
seeks to create a stand-alone voluntary European crowdfunding regime,
which would leave current systems unchanged and allow crowdfunding
platforms to choose to provide their services under national law or engage in
cross-border crowdfunding using European norms.404
A. Provisions relating to Intermediaries (Platforms)
Intermediaries must have an establishment in an EU member state and be
registered with and authorized to operate by the European Securities and

401. See generally Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on European Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSP) for Business, COM
(2018) 113 final (Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter EU Proposed Reg.], https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018PC0113 (stating that the
proposal adopts measures to support the facilitation of crowdfunding practices).
402. See id. at 2 (noting that the current crowdfunding regulatory regimes throughout
Europe range from no regulation to strict application of investor protection rules); see
also Commission Staff Working Document: Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets
Union, at Annex 2, SWD (2016) 154 final (May 3, 2016), https://ec.europa
.eu/info/system/files/crowdfunding-report-03052016_en.pdf (describing the current
crowdfunding legislative frameworks throughout the EU).
403. EU Proposed Reg., supra note 401, at 12–13.
404. See id. at 5–8 (detailing the crowdfunding benefits to investors and small
businesses).
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Markets Authority (“ESMA”).405 Once authorized, an intermediary is listed
in a register maintained by ESMA and is subject to its jurisdiction and
regulation.406 ESMA has substantial powers to regulate platforms, including
the power to request information, inspect, investigate, fine, and impose
penalties.407
Intermediaries are expected to act honestly, fairly, professionally, and in
the best interest of their clients. Unlike the case of the United States and
Spain, they are allowed to open discretionary accounts that allow employees
of the platform to make investment decisions on behalf of their client, but
they must disclose the exact method and parameters of that discretion.
Intermediaries are also required to take all necessary steps to obtain the best
possible results for their clients408 and are expected to establish and oversee
adequate policies and procedures to ensure their effective and prudent
management,409 as well as procedures for the prompt, fair, and consistent
handling of customer complaints.410 They may outsource some of their
activities to third parties but remain responsible for compliance with
outsourced activities.411 They must also provide their clients with
information regarding their asset-safekeeping and payment services.412
Intermediaries are subject to specific conflicts of interest provisions.413
405. See id. art. 10 (providing that the application process requires a platform to
provide substantial information regarding its structure, operations, governance
arrangements, systems, outsourcing arrangements, and internal control mechanisms and
that management staff must be identified and substantial information regarding their
background, knowledge, skills, experience and absence of criminal record and financial
improprieties must be submitted).
406. Id. arts. 11–12; see id. art. 13 (stating that ESMA also has the power to withdraw
a panel’s authorization for a number of reasons).
407. Id. arts. 22–30, 32–34; see id. arts. 13(2), 20, 30, 35, 37 (summarizing that the
proposed Regulation envisions substantial cooperation in the regulation of crowdfunding
between ESMA and national regulatory agencies).
408. See id. art. 4(2)–(4) (providing that intermediaries are not allowed to pay or
accept any remuneration or benefit for routing investors’ orders to a particular
crowdfunding offer in their or a third party’s platform).
409. Id. art. 5.
410. Id. art. 6(2).
411. See id. art. 8(2) (requiring that outsourcing of any operational functions may not
materially impair the platform’s internal controls or impair ESMA’s ability to monitor
the platform’s compliance with its obligations).
412. Id. art. 9.
413. See id. art. 7 (stating that the provisions include, for example, that platforms must
maintain and operate effective internal rules to prevent conflicts of interest, platforms
may not have any financial participation in any crowdfunding offer on their platform and
may not accept as clients any of its employees, shareholders, or controlling persons; that
all conflicts of interest, as well as the steps taken to mitigate any risks arising therefrom,
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They are also responsible for providing prospective investors with a key
investment information sheet and keeping it updated.414 The platform is also
required to insert a risk warning in all key investment information sheets.415
Further, the intermediaries must keep all agreements and records related to
their services for five years and provide clients with immediate access to
these records at all times.416
B. Provisions relating to Sellers of Securities
Unlike the JOBS Act and Ley 5/2015, the proposed Regulation has
virtually no provisions directly related to issuers seeking to list their
securities for sale with an intermediary.417 The only such provision appears
to be Article 16, which provides that the key investment information sheet
about proposed crowdfunding transactions must be drawn up by the issuer
and must contain the specific information set forth in the Annex to the
proposed Regulation.418 Issuers are also required to complement or amend
the key investment information sheet in order to correct any material
omissions, mistakes, or inaccuracies identified by the platform.419 The lack
of provisions that seek to hold issuers liable for fraud or misrepresentation is
striking.420

must be disclosed clients and potential clients); see also id. art. 19 (requiring that service
platforms must also ensure that all marketing communications to investors are clearly
identifiable as such, and that these communications only indicate where and in which
language clients can obtain information about individual projects or offers).
414. See id. art. 16 (providing that the key investment information sheet is prepared
by the issuer); see also infra notes 311–12 and accompanying text (mandating that
investors submit documentation to authorize securities transactions similar to a
prospectus).
415. Id. at art. 16(2)(c).
416. Id. at art. 18.
417. Compare EU Proposed Reg, supra note 401, art. 1 (limiting the scope of the
regulation to crowdfunding intermediaries and not transactions), with Eugenia
Macchiavello, Peer-to-Peer Lending and the “Democratization” of Credit Markets:
Another Financial Innovation Puzzling Regulators, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 521, 556
(2015) (explaining U.S. regulations fit peer-to-peer lending within the already-existing
framework for securities regulation), and Alejandro Gonzalez, New Securitization
Framework in Spain, 9 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 601 (2015) (indicating Spain’s new
lending regulation incorporates crowdfunding into its regulatory framework for
securitized lending).
418. EU Proposed Reg, supra note 401, art. 16.
419. See id. art. 16(6).
420. See id.
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C. Provisions relating to Investors
The proposed Regulation requires that all information that intermediaries
provide to clients or potential clients about themselves and any proposed
services or investments, including the nature of risks associated therewith, is
clear, comprehensible, complete, and correct. This information must be
provided before any potential client enters into a crowdfunding
transaction.421
Although the provisions of the proposed Regulation are similar to those of
the U.S. and Spanish legislation, they include several noteworthy provisions.
First, before giving prospective investors access to crowdfunded offers, the
platform is required to assess whether and which crowdfunding services
offered are appropriate for the investors.422 This assessment involves
consideration of the prospective investor’s general knowledge of risk in
investing and particular knowledge of risk in crowdfunding based on the
investor’s knowledge and experience.423 How this assessment is to be
undertaken is unclear from the proposed Regulation. If the platform
determines that the prospective investor has insufficient knowledge and
experience of the risks involved in crowdfunding transactions, it must inform
her that their services may be inappropriate and give a warning of the risks
involved. How such a warning is to be given to the prospective investor is
unclear, and a potential investor may still invest in the site after receiving
this warning. This requirement goes beyond those set forth in the U.S. and
Spanish legislation.424 Another innovative provision requires platforms to
offer the prospective investors and investors the ability to use a simulation
in order to determine their ability to bear loss as a result of their proposed
investments.425
The proposed Regulation has three unique provisions of interest. The first,
which allows platforms to exercise discretion in investing on behalf of its
clients,426 does not exist in either the U.S. or Spanish systems and is highly
problematic. Given the nature of crowdfunding, this authority may be
subject to abuse and increase the investment risk to unsophisticated
investors, especially given the lack of provisions establishing liability for
421. Id. art. 14.
422. Id. art. 15(1).
423. See id. (providing that crowdfunding platforms are required to make this

assessment for each investor every two years).
424. Id. art. 15(4).
425. Id. art. 15(5).
426. See id. art 4(4) (providing that crowdfunding service providers may “exercise
discretion on behalf of their clients with respect to the parameters of the clients’ orders”).
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issues or intermediaries in the proposed Regulation. The requirement that
the platform investigate the suitability of potential investors, which goes
beyond the requirement of both the JOBS Act and Ley 5/2015,427 is also
likely to be controversial. It requires the platform to go beyond the investor’s
representation about investor knowledge and understanding of risk and
requires an assessment of the investor’s suitability for investing in
crowdfunded transactions. Although this proposition sounds desirable from
a consumer protection perspective, it is problematic. The proposed
regulation does not state how this assessment is to be done, and what criteria
— objective or subjective — it must be based on. This assessment is likely
to be expensive and time-consuming, and platforms will not, in all
likelihood, be able to recoup their expense in complying with this
requirement. Moreover, since the proposed Regulation does not forbid
unsuitable investors from investing in crowdfunded transactions, its value as
a consumer protection measure is limited.428 The simulation requirement,429
however, is not only innovative, but worthy of being considered by both the
United States and Spain. A computer-generated graph simulation would
probably more vividly illustrate the risk of investing in crowdfunded
securities than a series of general disclosures about the risk of investing in
crowdfunded transactions. Given current computer technology, this
simulation should be relatively simple and inexpensive to create and
implement.
The proposed Regulation is meant to supplement, not supplant, national
crowdfunding legislation.430 For those EU member states with no
crowdfunding legislation, the Regulation may serve as a way to introduce
crowdfunding to their legal systems. Many of its provisions are similar to
those of the JOBS Act, Regulation CF, and Ley 5/2015.431 Others, worsen,
rather than vet, the accuracy and completeness of the information posted
online. Intermediaries are allowed to open discretionary accounts and are
allowed to outsource most, if not all, of their operational functions. As noted
above, the potential for a platform to engage in acts of fraud, negligence, and
427. Compare supra notes 190–92, 216 and accompanying text (describing and
analyzing the JOBS Act’s consumer crowdfunding investor suitability requirements),
with supra notes 317–19 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing Ley 5/2015’s
consumer crowdfunding investor suitability requirements).
428. See supra Part IV.B.ii.c. (discussing investor motivation).
429. See EU Proposed Reg, supra note 401, art. 15(5).
430. See EU Proposed Reg, supra note 401, at 2, 8.
431. See id. at 2–3. See generally Macchiavello, supra note 417 (describing the
current regulatory environment around crowdfunding, including the JOBS Act and Ley
5/2015).
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abuse is very high under these circumstances.
Although intermediaries are required to assess the suitability of potential
investors to a much greater degree than the United States or Spain (and it is
unclear from the proposed Regulation what information this vetting
encompasses), a finding that the potential investor is unsuitable for a
crowdfunding investment does not prevent that individual from investing. In
this case, what is the purpose of investor vetting if its results have no effect?
However, the proposed Regulation’s requirement that investor education
include computer-generated simulations is innovative and worthy of
consideration.
Unlike its Spanish and U.S. counterparts, the proposed Regulation has
very few provisions directly related to issuers.432 Notably, although issuers
are responsible for the completeness and accuracy of the information about
them posted on the intermediary’s site, there is no provision making issuers
liable for fraud or misrepresentations.
Lastly, it is striking that the proposed Regulation does not contain any of
the investor protection provisions set forth in its United States and Spanish
counterparts.433 This defect must be remedied before the Regulation is
finalized.
VII. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, raising capital through crowdfunding transactions is by
its nature a risky endeavor and presents a series of issues that affect startup
companies seeking financing, as well as potential investors and the state,
acting regulator of the investment markets. These issues are difficult to
resolve because government regulators are faced with two contradictory
missions: facilitating the acquisition of capital by businesses and protecting
investors and the market from fraud and manipulation. Given the nature of
crowdfunding and its actors, fulfilling both missions is extremely
challenging.
On one hand, in order to facilitate the acquisition of capital by startup
businesses through crowdfunding, regulators must make the process simple,
quick, and inexpensive. This would involve simple forms, limited
disclosures, and low fees. Protecting investors and the market from fraud
432. See EU Proposed Reg, supra note 401, at 8–10 (discussing who the proposed
regulation’s provisions apply to and how it addresses money laundering and fraud
concerns).
433. See id.; see also John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act’s Strange Bedfellows:
Democracy and Start-Up Company Investing, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 357, 362 (2013);
Gonzalez, supra note 417.
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and manipulation, on the other hand, may be achieved by educating
investors, requiring full disclosure of all material facts regarding the
company and the offering, establishing time constraints on sales to allow
both potential investors and the market time to absorb and evaluate the
disclosed information and appropriately price the offering, or limiting
investments for small investors. Unfortunately, utilizing these investor
protection mechanisms adds time, cost, and complexity to the capital
acquisition process.
The easier a regulator makes it for a startup company to raise capital by
deregulating the process, the less protection investors have against fraud and
manipulation. Conversely, the more protection investors have against fraud
and manipulation, the higher the cost and difficulty of raising capital. These
two interests need to be balanced, so that companies face a capital acquisition
process that provides them with reasonable access to capital, and investors
have an appropriate level of protection against fraud and manipulation. This
is the crowdfunding conundrum.
A. Solving the Crowdfunding Conundrum?
The crowdfunding conundrum has no solution. The major issue is whether
and how well the JOBS Act and Regulation CF, Ley 5/2015, and the EU
Proposed Regulation have balanced the risks and problems that occur in
crowdfunding transactions.
The answer to this question with regard to the JOBS Act and Regulation
CF is mixed. Issuers complain that the costs, regulatory burdens, and
potential liability make crowdfunding an unattractive proposition. Other
than the cost issue, these complaints are unfounded. The treatment of
intermediaries is, however, problematic. They are not required to have
minimum capital, insurance, experience, and expertise, which can result in
the registration of less than adequate firms on platforms. The vetting of
investors, issuers, and their principals imposes substantial compliance
obligations, and it is essentially outsourced to intermediaries without
indicating how this must be done and what amount of vetting by the
intermediary will protect it from liability. The protection of investors is also
inadequate, because of Regulation CF’s sliding investment caps and its
prohibitions against diversification and resale of crowdfunded investments.
Lastly, the limitations on the communications channel that I discussed above
are also an issue.
As I have noted, Congress and the SEC should consider the following
changes to the Act and Regulation CF:
Increase the maximum amount that can be raised in consumer
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crowdfunding transactions from one million to two million dollars;
Add minimum capitalization and insurance requirements to
crowdfunding intermediaries;
Clarify how the required vetting of investors and transactions will be
undertaken while balancing the interests to be protected with the costs and
effectiveness of the requirements to be adopted;
Replace the sliding investment cap with a set and relatively low
investment cap for unsophisticated crowdfunding investors and allow for
the diversification of investments within this cap;
Reconfigure investor educational materials so that they require
investor interaction and consider the use of computer graphics and
simulations in these materials;
Consider opening a portion of the communications channel
administered by the intermediaries to non-registered potential investors
who might have relevant information concerning the company or the
issue;
Consider adopting a shareholder’s bill of rights similar to that of Ley
5/2015.
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